Market Failures of Carbon Trading

Abstract

In economic theory, a cap-and-trade system is a market-based system mechanism that internalizes the environmental impact of economic activity and reduces pollution with minimal costs. Given that carbon trading is a financial market, we evaluate its efficiency using finance and asset-pricing tools. Our analysis of the universe of transactions in the European Union Emission Trading System in 2005-2020 demonstrates that this prominent cap-and-trade system for carbon emissions is dramatically inefficient because of a number of unintended consequences that significantly undermine its purposes. First, about 40% of firms never trade in a given year. Second, many firms only trade in the surrendering months, when compliance is immediate. We also show that these are the months where the price of emission allowances is predictably high. This surrendering trading pattern alone leads to a total estimated loss of about Euro 5 billion for the regulated firms, or about 2% of the traded volume of the regulated firms in the sample period. Third, a number of operators engage in speculative trading and profit by exploiting the market with private information. We estimate that these operators in total make about Euro 8 billion, or about 3.5% of the traded volume of the regulated firms in the sample period.