EvilPromptFuzzer: generating inappropriate content based on text-to-image models

IF 3.9 4区 计算机科学 Q2 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Juntao He, Haoran Dai, Runqi Sui, Xuejing Yuan, Dun Liu, Hao Feng, Xinyue Liu, Wenchuan Yang, Baojiang Cui, Kedan Li
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Abstract

Text-to-image (TTI) models provide huge innovation ability for many industries, while the content security triggered by them has also attracted wide attention. Considerable research has focused on content security threats of large language models (LLMs), yet comprehensive studies on the content security of TTI models are notably scarce. This paper introduces a systematic tool, named EvilPromptFuzzer, designed to fuzz evil prompts in TTI models. For 15 kinds of fine-grained risks, EvilPromptFuzzer employs the strong knowledge-mining ability of LLMs to construct seed banks, in which the seeds cover various types of characters, interrelations, actions, objects, expressions, body parts, locations, surroundings, etc. Subsequently, these seeds are fed into the LLMs to build scene-diverse prompts, which can weaken the semantic sensitivity related to the fine-grained risks. Hence, the prompts can bypass the content audit mechanism of the TTI model, and ultimately help to generate images with inappropriate content. For the risks of violence, horrible, disgusting, animal cruelty, religious bias, political symbol, and extremism, the efficiency of EvilPromptFuzzer for generating inappropriate images based on DALL.E 3 are greater than 30%, namely, more than 30 generated images are malicious among 100 prompts. Specifically, the efficiency of horrible, disgusting, political symbols, and extremism up to 58%, 64%, 71%, and 50%, respectively. Additionally, we analyzed the vulnerability of existing popular content audit platforms, including Amazon, Google, Azure, and Baidu. Even the most effective Google SafeSearch cloud platform identifies only 33.85% of malicious images across three distinct categories.

Abstract Image

EvilPromptFuzzer:基于文本到图像模型生成不当内容
文本到图像(TTI)模型为许多行业提供了巨大的创新能力,而由其引发的内容安全问题也引起了广泛关注。大量研究都集中在大型语言模型(LLM)的内容安全威胁上,但对 TTI 模型内容安全的全面研究却少之又少。本文介绍了一种名为 EvilPromptFuzzer 的系统工具,旨在模糊 TTI 模型中的邪恶提示。针对 15 种细粒度风险,EvilPromptFuzzer 利用 LLMs 强大的知识挖掘能力构建种子库,其中的种子涵盖各种类型的字符、相互关系、动作、对象、表情、身体部位、位置、周围环境等。随后,这些种子被输入 LLM,以构建场景多样化的提示,从而削弱与细粒度风险相关的语义敏感性。因此,这些提示可以绕过 TTI 模型的内容审核机制,最终帮助生成内容不当的图像。对于暴力、恐怖、恶心、虐待动物、宗教偏见、政治符号和极端主义等风险,EvilPromptFuzzer 基于 DALL.E 3 生成不当图片的效率均大于 30%,即在 100 条提示中生成了 30 多张恶意图片。具体来说,恐怖、恶心、政治符号和极端主义的效率分别高达 58%、64%、71% 和 50%。此外,我们还分析了亚马逊、谷歌、Azure 和百度等现有流行内容审核平台的漏洞。即使是最有效的谷歌 SafeSearch 云平台,也只能识别出 33.85% 的恶意图片,而这些恶意图片涉及三个不同的类别。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity Computer Science-Information Systems
CiteScore
7.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
77
审稿时长
9 weeks
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