Influencer-Centered Accounts of Manipulation

IF 1 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Micha H. Werner
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Advances in science and technology have added to our insights into the vulnerabilities of human agency as well as to the methods of exploiting them. This has raised the stakes for efforts to clarify the concept and ethics of manipulation. Among these efforts, Robert Noggle’s influencer-centered account of manipulation has been most significant. He defines manipulative acts as those whereby an agent intentionally influences a recipient’s attitudes so that they do not conform as closely as they otherwise would to the pertinent norms and ideals endorsed by the influencer. This provides a relatively simple and in many ways clear definition of manipulation. It sidesteps thorny debates about autonomy, freedom, or practical rationality. It also promises to reveal a conceptual parallel between manipulating and lying, and thus to explain why manipulation is pro tanto wrong. In one respect, however, the account remains ambiguous: It remains unclear whether, and to what extent, it requires that influencers’ beliefs about what is ideal for their recipients to be grounded in some effort on the part of the influencer to identify with or take on the role of her recipient. This paper explains this ambiguity. It argues that influencer-centrism cannot remain indifferent to the validity of an agent’s beliefs about the ideal state of the recipient and provide an identification requirement that would render the whole account plausible and sufficiently determinate.

以影响者为中心的操纵描述
科学和技术的进步使我们更加深入地了解了人类代理的脆弱性以及利用这些脆弱性的方法。这对澄清操纵的概念和伦理的工作提出了更高的要求。在这些努力中,罗伯特-诺格(Robert Noggle)以影响者为中心的操纵论最为重要。他将操纵行为定义为:代理人故意影响接受者的态度,使其无法与影响者认可的相关规范和理想保持一致。这为操纵提供了一个相对简单的定义,而且在很多方面都很清晰。它避开了关于自主、自由或实践理性的棘手争论。它还有望揭示操纵与撒谎之间的概念相似性,从而解释为什么操纵在本质上是错误的。然而,在一个方面,这一论述仍然模棱两可:它是否以及在多大程度上要求影响者关于受影响者理想状态的信念必须建立在影响者认同或扮演受影响者角色的某种努力之上,这一点仍然不清楚。本文解释了这种模糊性。它论证了影响者中心论不能对代理人关于接受者理想状态的信念的有效性无动于衷,也不能提供一种认同要求,使整个论述可信并具有足够的确定性。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
10.00%
发文量
74
期刊介绍: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice is a double-anonymous peer-reviewed philosophical journal which aims to publish the best work produced in all fields of practical philosophy. It welcomes high-quality, rigorous and original, submissions regardless of the traditions or schools of thought from which they derive. As an editorial priority, however, published papers should be accessible to the philosophical community at large and as free as possible of unnecessary jargon. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice publishes work on ethical theories that address practical problems, as well as work that presents or examines empirical findings regarding moral practices relevant for ethical theorizing. The journal therefore actively seeks to promote cross-fertilization across areas of practical philosophy—such as moral, political, legal, and social philosophy—and more empirical disciplines, such as medicine, economics, sociology, political science, and psychology. It welcomes work in applied ethics provided that it can offer theoretical or normative contributions to larger philosophical debates. The journal also considers historically-oriented contributions provided they are not mainly exegetical and can offer insights for current debates in practical philosophy. The journal endorses the BPA/ SWIP-UK Good Practice for Journals. Further details are available in our Review Policy document.
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