Does Smaller Government Mean Less Corruption?

IF 0.5 Q4 ECONOMICS
Oguzhan Dincer
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Government intervention, whether in the role of a regulator or a market participant, presents opportunities for corruption. A burdensome regulatory environment creates more opportunities and incentives for individuals and firms to circumvent these regulations by resorting to different forms of bribery. Glaeser and Saks find that benefits of circumventing the regulations increase as the size of the government increases. The studies collected in this special issue investigate the relationship between various forms of government interventions on corruption.
小政府是否意味着少腐败?
政府的干预,无论是作为监管者还是市场参与者,都为腐败提供了机会。繁琐的监管环境为个人和企业创造了更多的机会和动机,使他们可以通过不同形式的贿赂来规避这些监管。Glaeser 和 Saks 发现,规避法规的好处随着政府规模的扩大而增加。本特刊收集的研究调查了各种形式的政府干预与腐败之间的关系。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
30
期刊介绍: Public Finance Review is a professional forum devoted to US policy-oriented economic research and theory, which focuses on a variety of allocation, distribution and stabilization functions within the public-sector economy. Economists, policy makers, political scientists, and researchers all rely on Public Finance Review, to bring them the most up-to-date information on the ever changing US public finance system, and to help them put policies and research into action. Public Finance Review not only presents rigorous empirical and theoretical papers on public economic policies, but also examines and critiques their impact and consequences. The journal analyzes the nature and function of evolving US governmental fiscal policies at the national, state and local levels.
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