Symmetric and Dual PRFs from Standard Assumptions: A Generic Validation of a Prevailing Assumption

IF 2.3 3区 计算机科学 Q2 COMPUTER SCIENCE, THEORY & METHODS
Mihir Bellare, Anna Lysyanskaya
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Abstract

A two-input function is a dual PRF if it is a PRF when keyed by either of its inputs. Dual PRFs are assumed in the design and analysis of numerous primitives and protocols including HMAC, AMAC, TLS 1.3 and MLS. But, not only do we not know whether particular functions on which the assumption is made really are dual PRFs; we do not know if dual PRFs even exist. What if the goal is impossible? This paper addresses this with a foundational treatment of dual PRFs, giving constructions based on standard assumptions. This provides what we call a generic validation of the dual PRF assumption. Our approach is to introduce and construct symmetric PRFs, which imply dual PRFs and may be of independent interest. We give a general construction of a symmetric PRF based on a function having a weak form of collision resistance coupled with a leakage hardcore function, a strengthening of the usual notion of hardcore functions we introduce. We instantiate this general construction in two ways to obtain two specific symmetric and dual PRFs, the first assuming any collision-resistant hash function and the second assuming any one-way permutation. A construction based on any one-way function evades us and is left as an intriguing open problem.

Abstract Image

来自标准假设的对称和双 PRF:流行假设的通用验证
如果一个双输入函数在被任一输入键控时都是一个 PRF,那么它就是一个双 PRF。在许多基元和协议(包括 HMAC、AMAC、TLS 1.3 和 MLS)的设计和分析中,都假定了双 PRF。但是,我们不仅不知道做出这种假设的特定函数是否真的是双 PRF,也不知道双 PRF 是否存在。如果目标是不可能实现的呢?本文通过对偶 PRF 的基础处理来解决这个问题,给出了基于标准假设的构造。这就是我们所说的对偶 PRF 假设的通用验证。我们的方法是引入和构建对称 PRF,这意味着对偶 PRF,并且可能具有独立的意义。我们给出了对称 PRF 的一般构造,它基于一个具有弱形式抗碰撞性的函数和一个泄漏核心函数,这是对我们引入的核心函数通常概念的加强。我们用两种方法实例化这种一般构造,以获得两种特定的对称和对偶 PRF,第一种假设任何抗碰撞哈希函数,第二种假设任何单向排列。基于任何单向函数的构造都会被我们回避,成为一个有趣的未决问题。
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来源期刊
Journal of Cryptology
Journal of Cryptology 工程技术-工程:电子与电气
CiteScore
7.10
自引率
3.30%
发文量
24
审稿时长
18 months
期刊介绍: The Journal of Cryptology is a forum for original results in all areas of modern information security. Both cryptography and cryptanalysis are covered, including information theoretic and complexity theoretic perspectives as well as implementation, application, and standards issues. Coverage includes such topics as public key and conventional algorithms and their implementations, cryptanalytic attacks, pseudo-random sequences, computational number theory, cryptographic protocols, untraceability, privacy, authentication, key management and quantum cryptography. In addition to full-length technical, survey, and historical articles, the journal publishes short notes.
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