In the Shadow of Global Polycrisis: Consensus and Polarization in the 2023 Estonian and Finnish Parliamentary Elections

IF 3.1 1区 社会学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Mari-Liis Jakobson, Johanna Peltoniemi
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This also resulted in the rapid rise of energy prices and the danger of energy deficit, rise of inflation and interest rates.</p><p>Hence, the general elections in Estonia in March 2023 and Finland in April 2023 took place in a situation of heightened international, economic and societal tensions and the outgoing governments having mainly dealt with crisis governance rather than focusing on fulfilling their electoral promises. In addition, both election campaigns also bore marks of bloc politics, where an otherwise multi-party system becomes aligned in two major camps and the campaign becomes a referendum on the proposed policies of these two camps.</p><p>Whilst polarization – both affective and political – is very well documented in the United States, it is also making headways into European politics. Political campaign cultures and government–opposition relations are changing even in countries like Finland and Estonia, which have usually been characterized by notably low levels of polarization (Bettarelli et al., <span>2023</span>; Nord et al., <span>2024</span>). Previous research has suggested that after a crisis, voters are particularly attracted to the political rhetoric of the (extreme) right. For instance, after a financial crisis, extreme right-wing parties increase their vote share by 30 percent (Funke et al., <span>2016</span>). Moreover, as Lisinska (<span>2022</span>) has noted, in times of crisis, when taking substantial measures is of particular importance, continued polarization often leads to democracy fatigue. Whilst Estonia and Finland have not faced democracy fatigue, it seems clear that following the turbulent times of the last decade have led both countries to unforeseen levels of polarization and emergence of populist right wing. Especially Finland has a long tradition of multiparty collaboration, having a history of coalitions including from left to right, but the consensus-oriented society has lately reformed towards bloc politics with strong divisions between political camps. This shift towards bloc politics has resulted in more pronounced ideological divides and a rise in populist rhetoric. The political landscape in both Estonia and Finland now reflects a growing fragmentation, where the emergence of right-wing populism signals a significant departure from the historical consensus-driven political culture.</p><p>Estonia and Finland are two neighbouring countries with traditionally different political standings and history. During the cold war, Estonia remained behind the Iron Curtain, whilst Finland was a neutral country. After Estonia regained its independence in 1991, it launched its (re)integration to the West, becoming a member of the EU in 2004 (which Finland had joined in 1995) and, in the same year, also joined NATO, whilst Finland remained neutral. Socio-economically, Finland is a Nordic welfare state, whereas Estonia has since its independence been a liberal welfare state. Despite their differences, Finland and Estonia share strong cultural roots (both speak a Finno-Ugric language, which differentiates them from both the Scandinavian and the Baltic countries) and have maintained a very amicable relationship.</p><p>Both countries have a parliamentary political system, where the government is formed based on the results of the parliamentary election (although Finland used a semi-presidential system until the 1990s and, unlike Estonia, still elects its president directly). The Estonian parliament Riigikogu has 101 seats and the Finnish Eduskunta has 200 seats. Both countries use a proportional voting system, where the country is divided into electoral districts (12 districts in Estonia and 13 districts in Finland). In both Estonia and Finland, votes are cast directly for the candidate and indirectly for the party (or electoral list). Whilst Finland also allows electoral alliances to compete in the elections, which are an attractive solution for smaller parties, Estonia allows only parties and single candidates to compete. In Estonia, the electoral threshold is at 5%.</p><p>In Finland, the mandates are distributed in each electoral district, using the d'Hondt method. In Estonia, the seats are distributed in three rounds: first, personal mandates are distributed to the candidates who pass the quota (all votes divided by number of mandates) in the electoral district. This is also the only chance for single candidates to enter the parliament. In the second round, district mandates are distributed between party lists, using the quota method whilst the party lists are reordered according to the share of votes each candidate earned. In the third round, compensation mandates are distributed, using closed national lists and the modified d'Hondt method. Both election systems slightly advantage the larger parties.</p><p>In the following, we will give an overview of the electoral event in both countries, including the core campaign topics and the election results and the implications on both the domestic and international and EU level. We show that whilst the global polycrisis raises similar issues in Estonia and Finland, they play out rather differently, even within the common trend of emergent polarization and block politics. In addition, the article also demonstrates how the times of polycrisis entail taking important political decisions in between-elections periods rather than arguing them out during the election campaign. Finland's snap accession to the NATO after decades of the neutrality doctrine is a particular case in point.</p><p>Whilst the elections in Estonia and in Finland took place at an internationally turbulent time, they did not play a significant transformative role, but rather cemented the status quo. In the coalition agreements, both governments agreed to continue supporting Euro-Atlantic integration, including EU and NATO membership (Government Office, <span>2023a</span>).</p><p>According to Petteri Orpo's government programme, the EU is Finland's most important political and economic framework and value community. To negotiate the EU cleavage which ran between the members of the governing coalition (with the Finns Party adopting a soft Eurosceptic position), the government programme emphasized that developing the EU into a better and more functional union is in Finland's interest. However, the coalition programme did not elaborate on whether or how the EU should change. The primary objectives outlined for Finland's foreign and security policy were to safeguard Finland's independence and territorial integrity, prevent its involvement in military conflict and ensure the safety and well-being of its citizens. The European Union and NATO form the co-operative core of Finland's foreign policy. Whilst in the government, the Finns Party has softened its stance towards the European Union has softened. The Finns Party no longer seeks Finland's withdrawal from the European Union in its European Parliament election platform, whilst still in its 2019 European Parliament election program, the party stated that its long-term goal was an EU exit, either independently or as part of a broader coalition of EU-critical nations. This is in line with their decision to return to the ECR group in the European Parliament in 2023 after belonging to the ID-group in 2019–2023.</p><p>During the past decades, Finland has seen a paradigm change in foreign policy. Since WWII, Finland identified itself as a neutral Western country between the West and the Soviet Union. Since the Cold War ended and Russia opened, Finland continued the traditionally good relations with Russia, at the same time positioning itself as a militarily non-aligned European country. Yet the political leadership kept the door ajar for the NATO option, whilst the majority of the Finnish population was not willing to join. After February 2022 and the Russian hostilities towards Ukraine, the public opinion in Finland changed rapidly, and along with Sweden, Finland started a race towards NATO membership. Finland applied to join NATO on 18 May 2022, that is, 10 months prior to the election, and became a member on 4 April 2023, 2 days after the election, with both the outgoing and the incoming government supporting the membership. Whilst Finland's relationships with NATO and the United States was close already before, and the step to become a NATO member was not a large one, the rapid change in the foreign policy consensus was striking.</p><p>As a full member of the EU and NATO since 2004, Estonia continued on its Euro-Atlanticist integration course, which largely remained intact even during the Centre Party–EKRE–Fatherland government. However, the election partly functioned as a referendum on the government's policy of generous support to Ukraine, as Estonia had donated over 1% of Estonia's GDP in military aid to Ukraine and promised to increase the support after the election (Government Office, <span>2023b</span>). It can also be seen as a referendum on the active public diplomacy of Kaja Kallas, who had been taking a notably active role in negotiating EU's joint response (European Parliament, <span>2022</span>). Kallas had been advocating for the initiative of seizing Russia's frozen assets in the EU member states in order to finance Ukraine's victory (Bloomberg, <span>2023</span>), which was in 2024 approved as a measure both on the national as well as the EU level. Furthermore, the Reform Party ministers encouraged NATO members to increase their defence spending and donate 0.25% of their GDP to Ukraine in order to win the war against Russia (BBC, <span>2024</span>). The new government coalition formed in 2023 set defence and foreign policies as its priority, agreed to increase defence spending to 3% of GDP so as to develop various military capabilities and also advocate for raising the minimal level of defence spending from 2% to 2.5% of GDP across NATO. The Estonian government coalition also pledged to support the widening policies of the EU and NATO towards Eastern partnership countries and fostering the strategic partnership with the United States and co-operation with Nordic and Baltic countries (Government Office, <span>2023a</span>).</p><p>The 2023 elections in Estonia and Finland happened in the midst of a polycrisis, which heightened societal tensions and forced outgoing governments to take important political decisions without having expressly requested mandate for this. As a result, the 2023 election took bloc politics and polarization along the liberal-conservative cleavage to a new level and were partly about claiming approval for decisions taken. This introduced bloc politics and referendum-type of campaigning in both countries, despite notable differences in the political cultures and ideological leanings in Estonia and Finland.</p><p>Whilst the electoral outcomes varied – in Finland, a right-wing conservative coalition was formed, whilst in Estonia, a socially liberal coalition rose to power – both election campaigns were marked by the populist radical right becoming a pivotal player that voters either support or vote against. In both countries, the voters are still alien to the notions of bloc and tactical voting and largely in the dark about coalition possibilities, which on the one hand can be a possible backstop to the political polarization but also disempowering to the people as the sovereign.</p><p>Whilst the elections took place also at an internationally turbulent time, these did not introduce notable changes to the foreign and defence policy status quo. Both countries are continuing on the Euro-Atlantic integration course, viewing NATO and the EU as the core defence, economic and political communities. In Estonia, the election functioned as a referendum on the Reform Party's pro-Ukraine policy initiatives, and the election in Finland confirmed support for the decision to join NATO 10 months before the election when the public opinion which changed rapidly from opposing NATO membership to supporting joining the defence alliance. This marked the end of decades long neutrality policy for Finland, though changed less in defence policy, where Finland was already collaborating closely with NATO.</p>","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"62 S1","pages":"201-216"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jcms.13668","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jcms.13668","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

The beginning of the 2020s has been marked by a near global polycrisis (Lawrence et al., 2024). In addition to the global climate crisis brewing in the background, in 2020, the first global pandemic erupted, which pressured governments to take unprecedented measures and divided societies over social distancing measures and vaccination and disrupted global production and logistics chains and caused turbulence in demand and supply. In 2022, Russia launched full-scale war in Ukraine, which sent millions seeking refuge elsewhere in Europe, prompted unprecedented international economic sanctions on Russia and enhanced the military preparedness in most European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states. This also resulted in the rapid rise of energy prices and the danger of energy deficit, rise of inflation and interest rates.

Hence, the general elections in Estonia in March 2023 and Finland in April 2023 took place in a situation of heightened international, economic and societal tensions and the outgoing governments having mainly dealt with crisis governance rather than focusing on fulfilling their electoral promises. In addition, both election campaigns also bore marks of bloc politics, where an otherwise multi-party system becomes aligned in two major camps and the campaign becomes a referendum on the proposed policies of these two camps.

Whilst polarization – both affective and political – is very well documented in the United States, it is also making headways into European politics. Political campaign cultures and government–opposition relations are changing even in countries like Finland and Estonia, which have usually been characterized by notably low levels of polarization (Bettarelli et al., 2023; Nord et al., 2024). Previous research has suggested that after a crisis, voters are particularly attracted to the political rhetoric of the (extreme) right. For instance, after a financial crisis, extreme right-wing parties increase their vote share by 30 percent (Funke et al., 2016). Moreover, as Lisinska (2022) has noted, in times of crisis, when taking substantial measures is of particular importance, continued polarization often leads to democracy fatigue. Whilst Estonia and Finland have not faced democracy fatigue, it seems clear that following the turbulent times of the last decade have led both countries to unforeseen levels of polarization and emergence of populist right wing. Especially Finland has a long tradition of multiparty collaboration, having a history of coalitions including from left to right, but the consensus-oriented society has lately reformed towards bloc politics with strong divisions between political camps. This shift towards bloc politics has resulted in more pronounced ideological divides and a rise in populist rhetoric. The political landscape in both Estonia and Finland now reflects a growing fragmentation, where the emergence of right-wing populism signals a significant departure from the historical consensus-driven political culture.

Estonia and Finland are two neighbouring countries with traditionally different political standings and history. During the cold war, Estonia remained behind the Iron Curtain, whilst Finland was a neutral country. After Estonia regained its independence in 1991, it launched its (re)integration to the West, becoming a member of the EU in 2004 (which Finland had joined in 1995) and, in the same year, also joined NATO, whilst Finland remained neutral. Socio-economically, Finland is a Nordic welfare state, whereas Estonia has since its independence been a liberal welfare state. Despite their differences, Finland and Estonia share strong cultural roots (both speak a Finno-Ugric language, which differentiates them from both the Scandinavian and the Baltic countries) and have maintained a very amicable relationship.

Both countries have a parliamentary political system, where the government is formed based on the results of the parliamentary election (although Finland used a semi-presidential system until the 1990s and, unlike Estonia, still elects its president directly). The Estonian parliament Riigikogu has 101 seats and the Finnish Eduskunta has 200 seats. Both countries use a proportional voting system, where the country is divided into electoral districts (12 districts in Estonia and 13 districts in Finland). In both Estonia and Finland, votes are cast directly for the candidate and indirectly for the party (or electoral list). Whilst Finland also allows electoral alliances to compete in the elections, which are an attractive solution for smaller parties, Estonia allows only parties and single candidates to compete. In Estonia, the electoral threshold is at 5%.

In Finland, the mandates are distributed in each electoral district, using the d'Hondt method. In Estonia, the seats are distributed in three rounds: first, personal mandates are distributed to the candidates who pass the quota (all votes divided by number of mandates) in the electoral district. This is also the only chance for single candidates to enter the parliament. In the second round, district mandates are distributed between party lists, using the quota method whilst the party lists are reordered according to the share of votes each candidate earned. In the third round, compensation mandates are distributed, using closed national lists and the modified d'Hondt method. Both election systems slightly advantage the larger parties.

In the following, we will give an overview of the electoral event in both countries, including the core campaign topics and the election results and the implications on both the domestic and international and EU level. We show that whilst the global polycrisis raises similar issues in Estonia and Finland, they play out rather differently, even within the common trend of emergent polarization and block politics. In addition, the article also demonstrates how the times of polycrisis entail taking important political decisions in between-elections periods rather than arguing them out during the election campaign. Finland's snap accession to the NATO after decades of the neutrality doctrine is a particular case in point.

Whilst the elections in Estonia and in Finland took place at an internationally turbulent time, they did not play a significant transformative role, but rather cemented the status quo. In the coalition agreements, both governments agreed to continue supporting Euro-Atlantic integration, including EU and NATO membership (Government Office, 2023a).

According to Petteri Orpo's government programme, the EU is Finland's most important political and economic framework and value community. To negotiate the EU cleavage which ran between the members of the governing coalition (with the Finns Party adopting a soft Eurosceptic position), the government programme emphasized that developing the EU into a better and more functional union is in Finland's interest. However, the coalition programme did not elaborate on whether or how the EU should change. The primary objectives outlined for Finland's foreign and security policy were to safeguard Finland's independence and territorial integrity, prevent its involvement in military conflict and ensure the safety and well-being of its citizens. The European Union and NATO form the co-operative core of Finland's foreign policy. Whilst in the government, the Finns Party has softened its stance towards the European Union has softened. The Finns Party no longer seeks Finland's withdrawal from the European Union in its European Parliament election platform, whilst still in its 2019 European Parliament election program, the party stated that its long-term goal was an EU exit, either independently or as part of a broader coalition of EU-critical nations. This is in line with their decision to return to the ECR group in the European Parliament in 2023 after belonging to the ID-group in 2019–2023.

During the past decades, Finland has seen a paradigm change in foreign policy. Since WWII, Finland identified itself as a neutral Western country between the West and the Soviet Union. Since the Cold War ended and Russia opened, Finland continued the traditionally good relations with Russia, at the same time positioning itself as a militarily non-aligned European country. Yet the political leadership kept the door ajar for the NATO option, whilst the majority of the Finnish population was not willing to join. After February 2022 and the Russian hostilities towards Ukraine, the public opinion in Finland changed rapidly, and along with Sweden, Finland started a race towards NATO membership. Finland applied to join NATO on 18 May 2022, that is, 10 months prior to the election, and became a member on 4 April 2023, 2 days after the election, with both the outgoing and the incoming government supporting the membership. Whilst Finland's relationships with NATO and the United States was close already before, and the step to become a NATO member was not a large one, the rapid change in the foreign policy consensus was striking.

As a full member of the EU and NATO since 2004, Estonia continued on its Euro-Atlanticist integration course, which largely remained intact even during the Centre Party–EKRE–Fatherland government. However, the election partly functioned as a referendum on the government's policy of generous support to Ukraine, as Estonia had donated over 1% of Estonia's GDP in military aid to Ukraine and promised to increase the support after the election (Government Office, 2023b). It can also be seen as a referendum on the active public diplomacy of Kaja Kallas, who had been taking a notably active role in negotiating EU's joint response (European Parliament, 2022). Kallas had been advocating for the initiative of seizing Russia's frozen assets in the EU member states in order to finance Ukraine's victory (Bloomberg, 2023), which was in 2024 approved as a measure both on the national as well as the EU level. Furthermore, the Reform Party ministers encouraged NATO members to increase their defence spending and donate 0.25% of their GDP to Ukraine in order to win the war against Russia (BBC, 2024). The new government coalition formed in 2023 set defence and foreign policies as its priority, agreed to increase defence spending to 3% of GDP so as to develop various military capabilities and also advocate for raising the minimal level of defence spending from 2% to 2.5% of GDP across NATO. The Estonian government coalition also pledged to support the widening policies of the EU and NATO towards Eastern partnership countries and fostering the strategic partnership with the United States and co-operation with Nordic and Baltic countries (Government Office, 2023a).

The 2023 elections in Estonia and Finland happened in the midst of a polycrisis, which heightened societal tensions and forced outgoing governments to take important political decisions without having expressly requested mandate for this. As a result, the 2023 election took bloc politics and polarization along the liberal-conservative cleavage to a new level and were partly about claiming approval for decisions taken. This introduced bloc politics and referendum-type of campaigning in both countries, despite notable differences in the political cultures and ideological leanings in Estonia and Finland.

Whilst the electoral outcomes varied – in Finland, a right-wing conservative coalition was formed, whilst in Estonia, a socially liberal coalition rose to power – both election campaigns were marked by the populist radical right becoming a pivotal player that voters either support or vote against. In both countries, the voters are still alien to the notions of bloc and tactical voting and largely in the dark about coalition possibilities, which on the one hand can be a possible backstop to the political polarization but also disempowering to the people as the sovereign.

Whilst the elections took place also at an internationally turbulent time, these did not introduce notable changes to the foreign and defence policy status quo. Both countries are continuing on the Euro-Atlantic integration course, viewing NATO and the EU as the core defence, economic and political communities. In Estonia, the election functioned as a referendum on the Reform Party's pro-Ukraine policy initiatives, and the election in Finland confirmed support for the decision to join NATO 10 months before the election when the public opinion which changed rapidly from opposing NATO membership to supporting joining the defence alliance. This marked the end of decades long neutrality policy for Finland, though changed less in defence policy, where Finland was already collaborating closely with NATO.

全球多重危机的阴影下:2023 年爱沙尼亚和芬兰议会选举中的共识与两极分化
本世纪20年代初的特点是一场近乎全球性的多重危机(Lawrence et al., 2024)。除了正在酝酿的全球气候危机之外,2020年爆发了第一次全球大流行,迫使各国政府采取前所未有的措施,并在社会疏远措施和疫苗接种方面造成社会分裂,扰乱了全球生产和物流链,造成了供需动荡。2022年,俄罗斯在乌克兰发动全面战争,导致数百万人在欧洲其他地方避难,促使国际社会对俄罗斯实施前所未有的经济制裁,并加强了大多数欧盟和北大西洋公约组织(北约)成员国的军事准备。这也导致了能源价格的快速上涨以及能源短缺、通货膨胀和利率上升的危险。因此,2023年3月的爱沙尼亚大选和2023年4月的芬兰大选是在国际、经济和社会紧张局势加剧的情况下举行的,即将卸任的政府主要处理危机治理,而不是专注于履行其选举承诺。此外,这两次竞选活动也带有集团政治的痕迹,即多党制在两个主要阵营中结盟,竞选活动成为对这两个阵营提出的政策的全民公决。虽然两极分化——无论是情感上的还是政治上的——在美国是有据可查的,但它也在欧洲政治中取得了进展。即使在芬兰和爱沙尼亚这样的国家,政治竞选文化和政府-反对派关系也在发生变化,这些国家通常以两极分化程度明显较低为特征(Bettarelli et al., 2023;Nord et al., 2024)。先前的研究表明,危机过后,选民特别容易被(极端)右翼的政治言论所吸引。例如,在金融危机之后,极右翼政党的投票份额增加了30% (Funke et al., 2016)。此外,正如Lisinska(2022)所指出的,在危机时期,当采取实质性措施尤为重要时,持续的两极分化往往会导致民主疲劳。虽然爱沙尼亚和芬兰没有面临民主疲劳,但很明显,在过去十年的动荡时期之后,这两个国家的两极分化和民粹主义右翼的出现都达到了不可预见的程度。尤其是芬兰,有着悠久的多党合作传统,从左翼到右翼都有过联盟的历史,但这个以共识为导向的社会最近向政治阵营之间存在强烈分歧的集团政治转变。这种向集团政治的转变导致了更明显的意识形态分歧和民粹主义言论的兴起。爱沙尼亚和芬兰的政治格局现在都反映出日益分化,右翼民粹主义的出现标志着与历史上共识驱动的政治文化的重大背离。爱沙尼亚和芬兰是两个传统上政治地位和历史不同的邻国。冷战期间,爱沙尼亚仍在铁幕后面,而芬兰是一个中立国。爱沙尼亚在1991年重新获得独立后,开始了与西方的(重新)融合,2004年成为欧盟成员国(芬兰于1995年加入欧盟),并于同年加入北约,而芬兰则保持中立。社会经济上,芬兰是一个北欧福利国家,而爱沙尼亚自独立以来一直是一个自由福利国家。尽管存在差异,但芬兰和爱沙尼亚有着深厚的文化渊源(两国都说芬兰-乌戈尔语,这使它们与斯堪的纳维亚和波罗的海国家区别开来),并保持着非常友好的关系。这两个国家都有议会政治制度,政府是根据议会选举的结果组成的(尽管芬兰在20世纪90年代之前使用半总统制,并且与爱沙尼亚不同,芬兰仍然直接选举总统)。爱沙尼亚议会Riigikogu有101个席位,芬兰议会Eduskunta有200个席位。两国都采用比例投票制度,将国家划分为选区(爱沙尼亚为12个选区,芬兰为13个选区)。在爱沙尼亚和芬兰,选票直接投给候选人,间接投给政党(或选举名单)。芬兰也允许选举联盟在选举中竞争,这对小党派来说是一个有吸引力的解决方案,而爱沙尼亚只允许政党和单一候选人竞争。在爱沙尼亚,选举门槛是5%。在芬兰,使用d'Hondt方法将授权分配到每个选区。 在爱沙尼亚,席位分三轮分配:首先,个人授权分配给在选区中超过配额(所有选票除以授权数目)的候选人。这也是单一候选人进入国会的唯一机会。在第二轮选举中,各党按配额分配选区,而各党则按每位候选人得票的比例重新排序。在第三轮中,使用封闭的国家名单和改进的德洪特方法分配薪酬授权。两种选举制度都对大党略微有利。在下文中,我们将概述两国的选举事件,包括核心竞选主题和选举结果以及对国内、国际和欧盟层面的影响。我们表明,虽然全球多元危机在爱沙尼亚和芬兰引发了类似的问题,但它们的表现却截然不同,即使在新兴的两极分化和集团政治的共同趋势中也是如此。此外,本文还展示了多重危机时期是如何在选举期间做出重要的政治决策的,而不是在竞选期间进行辩论。在坚持了几十年的中立原则之后,芬兰迅速加入北约(NATO)就是一个很好的例子。虽然爱沙尼亚和芬兰的选举是在国际动荡时期举行的,但它们并没有发挥重大的变革作用,而是巩固了现状。在联合政府协议中,两国政府同意继续支持欧洲-大西洋一体化,包括加入欧盟和北约(Government Office, 2023a)。根据Petteri Orpo的政府计划,欧盟是芬兰最重要的政治和经济框架和价值共同体。为了解决执政联盟成员之间对欧盟的分歧(芬兰人党采取了温和的疑欧立场),政府计划强调,将欧盟发展成一个更好、更有效的联盟符合芬兰的利益。然而,联合政府的计划并没有详细说明欧盟是否应该改变,或者如何改变。芬兰外交和安全政策的主要目标是维护芬兰的独立和领土完整,防止其卷入军事冲突,并确保其公民的安全和福祉。欧盟和北约构成了芬兰外交政策的合作核心。在执政期间,芬兰人党对欧盟的立场有所软化。芬兰人党在其欧洲议会选举纲领中不再寻求芬兰退出欧盟,尽管该党仍在其2019年欧洲议会选举计划中表示,其长期目标是退出欧盟,无论是独立还是作为欧盟关键国家更广泛联盟的一部分。这与他们在2019-2023年属于id组后,于2023年重返欧洲议会ECR组的决定一致。在过去的几十年里,芬兰的外交政策发生了翻天覆地的变化。自二战以来,芬兰将自己定位为西方和苏联之间的中立西方国家。冷战结束,俄罗斯开放后,芬兰继续与俄罗斯保持传统的友好关系,同时将自己定位为一个军事不结盟的欧洲国家。然而,政治领导层对加入北约的选择敞开了大门,而大多数芬兰人并不愿意加入。在2022年2月和俄罗斯对乌克兰的敌对行动之后,芬兰的公众舆论发生了迅速变化,芬兰与瑞典一起开始了加入北约的竞赛。芬兰于2022年5月18日,即大选前10个月,申请加入北约,并于大选后2天,即2023年4月4日成为北约成员国,并得到了即将离任和即将上任的政府的支持。虽然芬兰与北约和美国的关系之前已经很密切,而且成为北约成员国的步骤并不大,但外交政策共识的迅速变化令人震惊。自2004年成为欧盟和北约的正式成员国后,爱沙尼亚继续其欧洲-大西洋一体化进程,即使在中党-埃克-祖国党执政期间,这一进程也基本保持不变。然而,选举在一定程度上是对政府慷慨支持乌克兰政策的公投,因为爱沙尼亚已经向乌克兰捐赠了超过1%的GDP的军事援助,并承诺在选举后增加对乌克兰的支持(政府办公室,2023b)。这也可以看作是对Kaja Kallas积极的公共外交的公投,她一直在谈判欧盟的联合回应中发挥着显著的积极作用(欧洲议会,2022年)。 卡拉斯一直主张没收俄罗斯在欧盟成员国的冻结资产,以资助乌克兰的胜利(Bloomberg, 2023),该倡议于2024年被批准为国家和欧盟层面的一项措施。此外,改革党的部长们鼓励北约成员国增加国防开支,并将其GDP的0.25%捐给乌克兰,以赢得对俄罗斯的战争(BBC, 2024)。2023年成立的新政府联合政府将国防和外交政策作为其优先事项,同意将国防开支增加到GDP的3%,以发展各种军事能力,并主张将北约最低国防开支水平从GDP的2%提高到2.5%。爱沙尼亚政府联盟还承诺支持欧盟和北约扩大对东方伙伴国家的政策,促进与美国的战略伙伴关系以及与北欧和波罗的海国家的合作(政府办公室,2023a)。2023年爱沙尼亚和芬兰的选举发生在多重危机之中,这加剧了社会紧张局势,迫使即将卸任的政府在没有明确请求授权的情况下做出重要的政治决定。因此,2023年的选举将集团政治和自由派与保守派之间的两极分化推向了一个新的高度,在一定程度上是为了要求批准所做的决定。尽管爱沙尼亚和芬兰的政治文化和意识形态倾向存在显著差异,但这在两国引入了集团政治和全民公决式的竞选活动。虽然选举结果各不相同——在芬兰,一个右翼保守联盟成立,而在爱沙尼亚,一个社会自由联盟上台——但两场选举的特点都是,民粹主义激进右翼成为选民要么支持、要么投票反对的关键力量。在这两个国家,选民仍然对集团和战术投票的概念感到陌生,对联盟的可能性基本上一无所知,这一方面可能会成为政治两极分化的后盾,但也会削弱人民作为主权的权力。虽然选举也是在国际动荡时期举行的,但这些选举并没有给外交和国防政策现状带来显著的变化。两国都在继续欧洲-大西洋一体化进程,将北约和欧盟视为核心的防务、经济和政治共同体。在爱沙尼亚,选举发挥了对改革党亲乌克兰政策倡议的全民公决的作用,芬兰的选举在选举前10个月证实了对加入北约决定的支持,当时公众舆论从反对加入北约迅速转变为支持加入防务联盟。这标志着芬兰长达数十年的中立政策的结束,尽管在国防政策上变化不大,芬兰已经与北约密切合作。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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18.20%
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