{"title":"Sharp Equilibria for Time-Inconsistent Mean-Field Stopping Games","authors":"Ziyuan Wang, Zhou Zhou","doi":"10.1137/23m1625512","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, Volume 62, Issue 4, Page 2319-2345, August 2024. <br/> Abstract. We investigate time-inconsistent mean-field stopping games under nonexponential discounting in discrete time. At the intrapersonal level, each player plays against her future selves as a result of the time inconsistency caused by nonexponential discounting. At the interpersonal level, she plays against other players due to players’ interaction via the proportion of players that have stopped. We look for sharp mean-field equilibria (MFEs), such that given other players’ stopping policies, the representative player’s strategy not only is an intrapersonal equilibrium, but also an optimal one among all such intrapersonal equilibria. We analyze two classes of examples. The first one is on time-inconsistent bank-run models, and we construct an (optimal) sharp MFE by a monotone iteration scheme. The second one has a Markovian setup and no common noise, and we show the existence of a sharp MFE based on the Tikhonov fixed-point theorem.","PeriodicalId":49531,"journal":{"name":"SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization","FirstCategoryId":"100","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1137/23m1625512","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"AUTOMATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, Volume 62, Issue 4, Page 2319-2345, August 2024. Abstract. We investigate time-inconsistent mean-field stopping games under nonexponential discounting in discrete time. At the intrapersonal level, each player plays against her future selves as a result of the time inconsistency caused by nonexponential discounting. At the interpersonal level, she plays against other players due to players’ interaction via the proportion of players that have stopped. We look for sharp mean-field equilibria (MFEs), such that given other players’ stopping policies, the representative player’s strategy not only is an intrapersonal equilibrium, but also an optimal one among all such intrapersonal equilibria. We analyze two classes of examples. The first one is on time-inconsistent bank-run models, and we construct an (optimal) sharp MFE by a monotone iteration scheme. The second one has a Markovian setup and no common noise, and we show the existence of a sharp MFE based on the Tikhonov fixed-point theorem.
期刊介绍:
SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization (SICON) publishes original research articles on the mathematics and applications of control theory and certain parts of optimization theory. Papers considered for publication must be significant at both the mathematical level and the level of applications or potential applications. Papers containing mostly routine mathematics or those with no discernible connection to control and systems theory or optimization will not be considered for publication. From time to time, the journal will also publish authoritative surveys of important subject areas in control theory and optimization whose level of maturity permits a clear and unified exposition.
The broad areas mentioned above are intended to encompass a wide range of mathematical techniques and scientific, engineering, economic, and industrial applications. These include stochastic and deterministic methods in control, estimation, and identification of systems; modeling and realization of complex control systems; the numerical analysis and related computational methodology of control processes and allied issues; and the development of mathematical theories and techniques that give new insights into old problems or provide the basis for further progress in control theory and optimization. Within the field of optimization, the journal focuses on the parts that are relevant to dynamic and control systems. Contributions to numerical methodology are also welcome in accordance with these aims, especially as related to large-scale problems and decomposition as well as to fundamental questions of convergence and approximation.