Solving Investors’ Problems with Access to Evidence in Damages Litigation: Suggestions for a Future Issuer Liability Regime

IF 2.1 4区 社会学 Q3 BUSINESS
Heidi M. K. Yli-Kankahila
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Private enforcement’s role in the European secondary securities market is narrow. Issuer companies’ civil liability for violations of the inside information disclosure obligation is no exception. While trying to avoid the shadow of the US class action institution, European scholarship has long explored ways to increase the role of private enforcement in the securities market. Harmonising issuer liability is one of the suggestions to create a more prominent role for private enforcement. Even though harmonising issuer liability would be a welcome option for legal certainty and investor protection, it seems unlikely to happen in the near future. As an initial step towards potential harmonisation, this article analyses credit rating agencies’ (CRAs) liability and liability for competition law violations from the viewpoint of information asymmetry in litigation. It evaluates whether the legislative solutions in the CRA III Regulation and the Competition Damages Directive regarding plaintiffs’ access to evidence could be used as models for a potential issuer liability regime. The article finds that the choices made in the Competition Damages Directive could serve as viable models for issuer liability. The provisions in that Directive solve the information asymmetry between the plaintiff and the defendant by granting the plaintiff access to evidence in litigation through a court order.

解决投资者在损害赔偿诉讼中获取证据的问题:对未来发行人责任制度的建议
私人执法机构在欧洲二级证券市场中的作用是狭隘的。发行人公司违反内部信息披露义务的民事责任也不例外。在努力避免美国集体诉讼制度阴影的同时,欧洲学术界长期以来一直在探索如何增强私人执法在证券市场中的作用。协调发行人责任是为私人执法创造更突出作用的建议之一。尽管统一发行人责任对于法律确定性和投资者保护来说是一个值得欢迎的选择,但在不久的将来似乎不太可能实现。作为可能实现统一的第一步,本文从诉讼中信息不对称的角度分析了信用评级机构(CRAs)的责任和违反竞争法的责任。文章评估了《资信评级机构条例 III》和《竞争损害赔偿指令》中有关原告获取证据的立法解决方案是否可作为潜在发行人责任制度的范本。文章认为,《竞争损害赔偿指令》中的选择可作为发行人责任的可行模式。该指令中的规定通过法院命令允许原告在诉讼中获取证据,从而解决了原告和被告之间的信息不对称问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.60
自引率
9.50%
发文量
32
期刊介绍: The European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) aims to promote a scholarly debate which critically analyses the whole range of organizations chosen by companies, groups of companies, and state-owned enterprises to pursue their business activities and offer goods and services all over the European Union. At issue are the enactment of corporate laws, the theory of firm, the theory of capital markets and related legal topics.
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