Research on platform empowerment strategies for the digital transformation of SMEs from the perspective of tripartite games

Zifu Fan, Dongyun Hu, Leifan Wu
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Abstract

With the current deep integration and development of the digital economy and the real economy, the industrial internet has become the key form of support for seizing the opportunities of the times and promoting the high-quality development of the real economy. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology considers the integration of "two industries" the main line; takes the acceleration of the construction of industrial internet platforms as the starting point; and coordinates the promotion of platform system construction, benchmarking, and application promotion. Leading industries in China, as well as third-party internet companies, have successively created multiple industrial internet platforms. However, currently, most platforms offer standardized services that cannot meet the transformation needs of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) at different stages. In addition, the willingness of SMEs to join these platforms is not strong, and ultimately, the desired effect has not been achieved. This article constructs an asymmetric evolutionary game model among three entities—platforms, SMEs, and the government—analyzes the evolutionary paths of the strategic evolution of each game entity and the influencing factors using the stability theorem of differential equations, and explores the evolutionary stable strategies of the system through the Jacobian matrix. Through numerical simulation, the impacts of government subsidy intensity and the platform cost-sharing ratio on the evolutionary stable strategies of the system are analyzed to explore how to promote the high-quality development of industrial internet platforms and attract a larger number of SMEs to use cloud services.
三方博弈视角下的中小企业数字化转型平台赋能战略研究
在当前数字经济与实体经济深度融合发展的背景下,工业互联网已成为抢抓时代机遇、推动实体经济高质量发展的重要支撑形式。工业和信息化部以 "两化 "融合为主线,以加快工业互联网平台建设为抓手,统筹推进平台体系建设、标杆打造和应用推广。我国主导产业以及第三方互联网企业相继创建了多个工业互联网平台。然而,目前大多数平台提供的是标准化服务,无法满足中小企业不同阶段的转型需求。此外,中小企业加入这些平台的意愿也不强烈,最终没有达到预期效果。本文构建了平台、中小企业和政府三个主体间的非对称演化博弈模型,利用微分方程的稳定性定理分析了各博弈主体战略演化的路径和影响因素,并通过雅各布矩阵探索了系统的演化稳定策略。通过数值模拟,分析政府补贴强度和平台成本分摊比例对系统演化稳定策略的影响,探讨如何促进工业互联网平台高质量发展,吸引更多中小企业使用云服务。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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