Can informal judicial norms protect against political pressure?

IF 3.7 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Review of International Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-08-08 DOI:10.1080/09692290.2024.2385649

Joost Pauwelyn, Krzysztof Pelc

引用次数: 0

Abstract

International tribunals are pulled between a commitment to judicial autonomy and the need to manage their members’ political expectations, lest these rein in the tribunal’s power. We argue that whe...

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非正式司法规范能否抵御政治压力？

国际法庭既要致力于司法自治，又要管理其成员的政治期望，以免这些期望束缚了法庭的权力。我们认为，当...

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来源期刊

Review of International Political Economy Multiple-

CiteScore

9.20

自引率

9.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Political Economy is a peer-reviewed journal welcoming constructive and critical contributions in all areas of political economy, including the Austrian, Behavioral Economics, Feminist Economics, Institutionalist, Marxian, Post Keynesian, and Sraffian traditions. The Review publishes both theoretical and empirical research, and is also open to submissions in methodology, economic history and the history of economic thought that cast light on issues of contemporary relevance in political economy. Comments on articles published in the Review are encouraged.