{"title":"Northern Realignment? Explaining Nordic Consent to NextGenerationEU","authors":"Johan Ekman, Rune Møller Stahl, Magnus Ryner","doi":"10.1111/jcms.13649","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article explains the consent of the European Union's (EU) Nordic member states to NextGenerationEU (NGEU). Broad domestic consensus against EU‐level fiscal federal measures, based on what the growth model literature calls labour‐inclusive export‐based growth models, was overcome through two channels. Despite principled opposition in public, Nordic governments responded almost instantly to the changes in German preferences in the ‘Moravcsik channel’ of intergovernmental bargaining. This was complemented by dynamics in the ‘Amsterdam School channel’ that co‐ordinated transnational support by export‐oriented business for an EU‐level recovery plan and set the stage for consensus formation with trade unions. Despite non‐trivial complications in the short run, the party systems followed these leads in executive and corporatist politics.","PeriodicalId":51369,"journal":{"name":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","volume":"141 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Jcms-Journal of Common Market Studies","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13649","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This article explains the consent of the European Union's (EU) Nordic member states to NextGenerationEU (NGEU). Broad domestic consensus against EU‐level fiscal federal measures, based on what the growth model literature calls labour‐inclusive export‐based growth models, was overcome through two channels. Despite principled opposition in public, Nordic governments responded almost instantly to the changes in German preferences in the ‘Moravcsik channel’ of intergovernmental bargaining. This was complemented by dynamics in the ‘Amsterdam School channel’ that co‐ordinated transnational support by export‐oriented business for an EU‐level recovery plan and set the stage for consensus formation with trade unions. Despite non‐trivial complications in the short run, the party systems followed these leads in executive and corporatist politics.