Does Audit Oversight Quality Reduce Insolvency Risk, Systematic Risk, and ROA Volatility? The Role of Institutional Ownership

Q4 Business, Management and Accounting
Rebecca Abraham, Hani El-Chaarani, Fitim Deari
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Abstract

The board of directors appoints the audit committee to assess the financial performance of the firm. The audit committee uses reports provided by audit firms, such as Form 10Ks, and annual reports to assess firm financial performance. The degree of audit oversight quality is a governance measure, which, if effective, may reduce firm risk. This study measures the effect of three measures of audit oversight quality on insolvency risk, systematic risk, and volatility of return on assets for a sample of U.S. pharmaceutical firms and energy firms from 2010 to 2022. All measures of audit oversight quality reduced firm risk, with the first measure reducing both systematic risk and volatility of return on assets, the second measure reducing systematic risk, and the third measure reducing volatility of return on assets. As institutional ownership is also a governance measure, we tested whether its joint effect with audit oversight quality reduced firm risk. This hypothesis was supported for all three measures of audit oversight quality for systematic risk and for the third audit oversight quality measure for volatility of assets. Robustness was established by replicating the regressions with an alternate governance measure, which yielded similar results. Endogeneity of all audit oversight quality measures was absent due to lack of significance of leverage, firm size, equity multiplier, and firm value in reducing risk through their effect on audit oversight quality.
审计监督质量能否降低破产风险、系统性风险和 ROA 波动性?机构所有权的作用
董事会任命审计委员会评估公司的财务业绩。审计委员会利用审计公司提供的报告(如 10K 表)和年度报告来评估公司的财务业绩。审计监督质量的高低是一项治理措施,如果有效,可以降低公司风险。本研究以 2010 年至 2022 年的美国制药公司和能源公司为样本,衡量了审计监督质量的三个衡量标准对破产风险、系统性风险和资产回报率波动性的影响。所有审计监督质量措施都降低了公司风险,第一种措施降低了系统性风险和资产回报率波动,第二种措施降低了系统性风险,第三种措施降低了资产回报率波动。由于机构所有权也是一种治理措施,我们检验了其与审计监督质量的联合效应是否会降低公司风险。在系统性风险方面,审计监督质量的所有三个衡量标准都支持这一假设;在资产波动方面,审计监督质量的第三个衡量标准也支持这一假设。通过使用另一种治理措施进行重复回归,得出了类似的结果,从而证实了稳健性。由于杠杆率、公司规模、股本乘数和公司价值在通过影响审计监督质量来降低风险方面缺乏重要性,因此所有审计监督质量衡量标准都不存在内生性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
512
审稿时长
11 weeks
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