Nagarjuna’s Ontology: Relativism, Paradox at the Limits of Thought vs Consistent Unity of Emptiness and Dependent Arising

IF 0.2 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Irina Urbanaeva
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Abstract

The article contains a critical analysis of relativistic “readings” of Nagarjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) – approaches in which emptiness is identified with dependent arising, and Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka appears as a synonym for relativity (Fyodor I. Shcherbatskoy, David J. Kalupahana, Shi Huifeng), emptiness – as an auxiliary means for purifying relative reality (Tao Jiang). Jay Garfield and Graham Priest, analyzing the emptiness of emptiness from the perspective of dialetheism, come to the conclusion about the existence of the ontological paradox of Nagarjuna, which means the identity of two realities – absolute and relative. Thus, Madhyamaka is reduced to relativism, albeit in a more subtle form, by considering the “true contradictions” at the limits of thought. The author of the article, relying on Tibetan texts (Heart Sutra, MMK, works of Aryadeva, Buddhapalita, Chandrakirti, Tsongkhapa), proves the fallacy of these attempts to ontologically relativize Madhyamaka. To understand the ontological specificity of Madhyamaka, it is important to understand both the difference between the two truths in this teaching and their specific unity as two ontological reverses of any object, and not as two realities or two domains of reality or two truths in the Western tradition.
龙树的本体论:相对主义、思维极限的悖论与空性和依存产生的一致统一性
文章对相对主义 "解读 "那伽牟尼的 "偈颂"(Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,MMK)的方法进行了批判性分析--在这些方法中,空性被认定为依他起性,而那伽牟尼的 "偈颂 "则作为相对性的同义词出现(费奥多尔-舍尔巴茨科伊、大卫-卡卢帕哈纳、石慧峰),空性--作为净化相对现实的辅助手段(陶江)。杰伊-加菲尔德(Jay Garfield)和格雷厄姆-普利斯特(Graham Priest)从辩证法的角度分析了 "空 "的 "空",得出了关于那伽跋那本体论悖论存在的结论,即绝对和相对两种实相的同一性。因此,通过考虑思维极限的 "真实矛盾",偈颂被简化为相对主义,尽管形式更为微妙。本文作者依据藏文典籍(《心经》、MMK、阿赖耶识、佛陀巴利达、钱德拉吉、宗喀巴的著作),证明了这些试图在本体论上将偈颂相对化的谬误。要理解偈颂在本体论上的特殊性,重要的是既要理解此教法中二谛的差异,又要理解它们作为任何对象的两个本体论颠倒的特殊统一性,而不是西方传统中的两个实相或两个实相领域或两个真理。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
VOPROSY FILOSOFII
VOPROSY FILOSOFII PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.40
自引率
50.00%
发文量
100
期刊介绍: "Вопросы философии" - академическое научное издание, центральный философский журнал в России. В настоящее время является органом Президиума Российской Академии Наук. Журнал "Вопросы философии" исторически тесно связан с Институтом философии РАН. Выходит ежемесячно. Журнал был основан в июле 1947 г. Интернет-версия журнала запущена в мае 2009 года.
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