Environmental sustainability under production competition with costly adjustments: An appraisal of firms’ behavior with regard to pollution dynamics

IF 6.7 2区 管理学 Q1 MANAGEMENT
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Abstract

The waning efficiency of natural pollution sinks and the predicted consequence of their irreversible transformation into pollution sources within the current century call into question the environmental sustainability of economic activity and, more specifically, its basic engine: horizontal competition. Among factors likely to cast doubt on the environmental sustainability of competition, competing firms’ approaches to pollution control deserve particular attention because myopic approaches that ignore pollution dynamics accelerate such transformations. Another potentially harmful factor is the cost of adjusting production, which can hinder firms’ ability to reduce their polluting emissions in a timely way. In the context of a Cournot market structure, we consider competing firms that incur a cost when adjusting production and are subject to pollution emission taxes. We analyze how production adjustment costs and firms’ choice of myopic or farsighted pollution control policies affect their competitiveness and the long-run sustainability of the environmental system. We show that competition is not compatible with environmental sustainability under a myopic pollution control policy when the maximum threshold of pollution absorption has already been exceeded. Myopic policies cannot neutralize history dependency, and extremely large production adjustment costs exacerbate the problem. In contrast, farsighted pollution control policies can eliminate history-dependency as long as the tax policy is not too restrictive, though they lead to a more polluted environment than myopic policies operating below the maximum absorption efficiency threshold.

在有成本调整的生产竞争条件下的环境可持续性:企业在污染动态方面的行为评估
本世纪内,自然污染汇的效率不断降低,而且预计它们将不可逆转地转变为污染源,这使人们对经济活动的环境可持续性,更具体地说,对其基本动力--横向竞争--产生了质疑。在可能对竞争的环境可持续性产生怀疑的因素中,竞争企业的污染控制方法值得特别关注,因为忽视污染动态的短视方法会加速这种转变。另一个潜在的有害因素是调整生产的成本,这会阻碍企业及时减少污染排放的能力。在库诺市场结构的背景下,我们考虑到竞争企业在调整生产时会产生成本,并且需要缴纳污染排放税。我们分析了生产调整成本和企业对近视或远视污染控制政策的选择如何影响其竞争力和环境系统的长期可持续性。我们的研究表明,在近视型污染控制政策下,当污染吸收的最大阈值已经被超过时,竞争与环境的可持续性是不相容的。近视政策无法中和历史依赖性,而极高的生产调整成本会加剧这一问题。相反,只要税收政策不是过于严格,有远见的污染控制政策就能消除历史依赖性,尽管与低于最大吸收效率阈值的近视政策相比,这些政策会导致更严重的环境污染。
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来源期刊
Omega-international Journal of Management Science
Omega-international Journal of Management Science 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学
CiteScore
13.80
自引率
11.60%
发文量
130
审稿时长
56 days
期刊介绍: Omega reports on developments in management, including the latest research results and applications. Original contributions and review articles describe the state of the art in specific fields or functions of management, while there are shorter critical assessments of particular management techniques. Other features of the journal are the "Memoranda" section for short communications and "Feedback", a correspondence column. Omega is both stimulating reading and an important source for practising managers, specialists in management services, operational research workers and management scientists, management consultants, academics, students and research personnel throughout the world. The material published is of high quality and relevance, written in a manner which makes it accessible to all of this wide-ranging readership. Preference will be given to papers with implications to the practice of management. Submissions of purely theoretical papers are discouraged. The review of material for publication in the journal reflects this aim.
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