Collaborative strategies in the product-sharing market considering manufacturer's capital entry

IF 9.8 1区 工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL
Xiaoxiao Chang, Lindu Zhao
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Digital technology and online platforms have enabled large-scale business-to-consumer (B2C) sharing of normalized products. Recently, B2C sharing platforms have also become very popular. The impact of B2C sharing on traditional manufacturers can be very significant. With increased competition on the business end, many manufacturers (e.g., BYD and Didi; FAW and T3) have accessed the sharing market to provide customized products and technology services in addition to outright sales to platforms. This paper studies a capital-constrained sharing platform and manufacturer's optimal collaborative strategy in the sharing market and the economic implications of their collaboration. We propose a decomposition framework to establish three capital collaborative strategies based on a non-collaborative strategy (N-with-C), which is associated with different levels of the platform's capital and the manufacturer's capital entry. The three collaborative strategies are physical capital collaboration without service capital constraints (P-without-SC), physical capital collaboration with physical and service capital constraints (P-with-SC) and physical and service capital collaboration with physical and service capital constraints (PS-with-SC). We employ a game-theoretic analytical model for our analysis. Our results show that (i) the choice of a certain collaboration strategy depends on the platform's and manufacturer's decisions and how such interaction is affected by decision parameters such as initial capital level, claim proportion, spillover of product launch quantity, utilization efficiency and service efficiency; (ii) with a decrease in the platform's capital level, the N-with-C strategy gradually ceases to be the sharing platform's strategy choice; and (iii) with the manufacturer's service entry, the manufacturer suffers a complete reversal of the optimal strategy choices when choosing between the non-collaborative strategy and collaborative strategies, but P-with-SC is better than non-collaboration under a higher claim proportion and the sharing platform always prefers to collaborate. These results suggest that an increasing asymmetry of capital input and control rights influences the level of collaboration between the sharing platform and manufacturer.

考虑制造商资本进入的产品共享市场合作战略
数字技术和在线平台实现了企业对消费者(B2C)大规模共享标准化产品。最近,B2C 共享平台也变得非常流行。B2C 共享对传统制造商的影响可能非常大。随着商业端的竞争加剧,许多制造商(如比亚迪和滴滴;一汽和 T3)都进入了共享市场,除了向平台直接销售外,还提供定制产品和技术服务。本文研究了资本受限的共享平台和制造商在共享市场中的最优合作策略,以及他们合作的经济意义。我们提出了一个分解框架,在非合作战略(N-with-C)的基础上建立了三种资本合作战略,它们与平台资本和制造商资本进入的不同水平相关联。这三种合作策略分别是无服务资本约束的实物资本合作(P-without-SC)、有实物资本和服务资本约束的实物资本合作(P-with-SC)以及有实物资本和服务资本约束的实物资本和服务资本合作(PS-with-SC)。我们采用博弈论分析模型进行分析。结果表明:(i) 某种合作战略的选择取决于平台和制造商的决策,以及这种互动如何受到初始资本水平、索赔比例、产品投放量溢出、利用效率和服务效率等决策参数的影响;(ii) 随着平台资本水平的降低,N-with-C 战略逐渐不再是共享平台的战略选择;iii)随着制造商的服务进入,制造商在非合作战略与合作战略之间的最优战略选择发生完全逆转,但在索赔比例较高的情况下,P-with-SC优于非合作,共享平台始终倾向于合作。这些结果表明,资本投入和控制权不对称程度的增加会影响共享平台与制造商之间的合作水平。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
International Journal of Production Economics
International Journal of Production Economics 管理科学-工程:工业
CiteScore
21.40
自引率
7.50%
发文量
266
审稿时长
52 days
期刊介绍: The International Journal of Production Economics focuses on the interface between engineering and management. It covers all aspects of manufacturing and process industries, as well as production in general. The journal is interdisciplinary, considering activities throughout the product life cycle and material flow cycle. It aims to disseminate knowledge for improving industrial practice and strengthening the theoretical base for decision making. The journal serves as a forum for exchanging ideas and presenting new developments in theory and application, combining academic standards with practical value for industrial applications.
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