Automated Generation of Fault-Resistant Circuits

Nicolai Müller, Amir Moradi
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Abstract

Fault Injection (FI) attacks, which involve intentionally introducing faults into a system to cause it to behave in an unintended manner, are widely recognized and pose a significant threat to the security of cryptographic primitives implemented in hardware, making fault tolerance an increasingly critical concern. However, protecting cryptographic hardware primitives securely and efficiently, even with wellestablished and documented methods such as redundant computation, can be a timeconsuming, error-prone, and expertise-demanding task. In this research, we present a comprehensive and fully-automated software solution for the Automated Generation of Fault-Resistant Circuits (AGEFA). Our application employs a generic and extensively researched methodology for the secure integration of countermeasures based on Error-Correcting Codes (ECCs) into cryptographic hardware circuits. Our software tool allows designers without hardware security expertise to develop fault-tolerant hardware circuits with pre-defined correction capabilities under a comprehensive fault adversary model. Moreover, our tool applies to masked designs without violating the masking security requirements, in particular to designs generated by the tool AGEMA. We evaluate the effectiveness of our approach through experiments on various block ciphers and demonstrate its ability to produce fault-tolerant circuits. Additionally, we assess the security of examples generated by AGEFA against Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and FI using state-of-the-art leakage and fault evaluation tools.
自动生成抗故障电路
故障注入(FI)攻击是指故意在系统中引入故障,使系统以非预期的方式运行,这种攻击已被广泛认可,并对在硬件中实施的加密基元的安全性构成了重大威胁,因此容错成为一个日益重要的问题。然而,要安全有效地保护加密硬件基元,即使采用冗余计算等成熟的记录方法,也是一项耗时、易出错且需要专业知识的任务。在这项研究中,我们为自动生成抗故障电路(AGEFA)提出了一个全面的全自动软件解决方案。我们的应用采用了一种经过广泛研究的通用方法,将基于纠错码(ECC)的对策安全集成到加密硬件电路中。我们的软件工具允许没有硬件安全专业知识的设计人员在综合故障对手模型下开发具有预定义校正能力的容错硬件电路。此外,我们的工具适用于掩码设计,不会违反掩码安全要求,尤其适用于 AGEMA 工具生成的设计。我们通过对各种区块密码的实验评估了我们方法的有效性,并证明了其生成容错电路的能力。此外,我们还利用最先进的泄漏和故障评估工具,评估了 AGEFA 针对侧信道分析 (SCA) 和 FI 生成的示例的安全性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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