Institutional Friction and Policy Responsiveness: The Puzzle of Coalitional Fragmentation and Executive-Legislative Balance

IF 1.5 2区社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Political Research Quarterly Pub Date : 2024-07-24 DOI:10.1177/10659129241263481

Jack Maedgen, Christopher Wlezien

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Abstract

Research on policy responsiveness to public opinion highlights differences owing to political institutions—both electoral and governmental. Electoral institutions that produce coalition governments tend to reduce responsiveness in between elections. Government institutions that divide powers horizontally, by contrast, appear to increase that responsiveness. These findings point to the role of institutional “friction” in shaping what governments do, though the two sources appear to produce different effects—one harmful and the other helpful. This paper explores this apparent contradiction. We revisit and clarify theoretical assumptions and outline alternative models of the effects of friction. Extending previous tests, now in 18 countries, we find clearer evidence supporting that earlier research and more firmly establish friction as the mechanism, particularly as regards the influence of electoral systems. The two institutional sources of friction appear to influence responsiveness in different ways, which has implications for politics and policy that we consider in the concluding section.

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体制摩擦与政策响应：联盟分裂与行政立法平衡之谜

关于政策对公众舆论的反应能力的研究强调了政治体制--包括选举体制和政府体制--造成的差异。产生联合政府的选举制度往往会降低两次选举之间的响应度。与此相反，横向分权的政府机构似乎会提高这种反应能力。这些研究结果表明了制度 "摩擦 "在影响政府行为方面所起的作用，尽管这两种来源似乎产生了不同的效果--一种是有害的，另一种是有益的。本文探讨了这一明显的矛盾。我们重新审视并澄清了理论假设，概述了摩擦效应的替代模型。在对 18 个国家进行的测试中，我们发现有更明确的证据支持之前的研究，并更牢固地确立了摩擦的作用机制，尤其是在选举制度的影响方面。摩擦的两个制度来源似乎以不同的方式影响着反应能力，这对政治和政策产生了影响，我们将在结论部分对此进行探讨。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Political Research Quarterly POLITICAL SCIENCE-

CiteScore

3.60

自引率

4.80%

发文量

109

期刊介绍： Political Research Quarterly (PRQ) is the official journal of the Western Political Science Association. PRQ seeks to publish scholarly research of exceptionally high merit that makes notable contributions in any subfield of political science. The editors especially encourage submissions that employ a mixture of theoretical approaches or multiple methodologies to address major political problems or puzzles at a local, national, or global level. Collections of articles on a common theme or debate, to be published as short symposia, are welcome as well as individual submissions.