{"title":"Institutional Friction and Policy Responsiveness: The Puzzle of Coalitional Fragmentation and Executive-Legislative Balance","authors":"Jack Maedgen, Christopher Wlezien","doi":"10.1177/10659129241263481","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Research on policy responsiveness to public opinion highlights differences owing to political institutions—both electoral and governmental. Electoral institutions that produce coalition governments tend to reduce responsiveness in between elections. Government institutions that divide powers horizontally, by contrast, appear to increase that responsiveness. These findings point to the role of institutional “friction” in shaping what governments do, though the two sources appear to produce different effects—one harmful and the other helpful. This paper explores this apparent contradiction. We revisit and clarify theoretical assumptions and outline alternative models of the effects of friction. Extending previous tests, now in 18 countries, we find clearer evidence supporting that earlier research and more firmly establish friction as the mechanism, particularly as regards the influence of electoral systems. The two institutional sources of friction appear to influence responsiveness in different ways, which has implications for politics and policy that we consider in the concluding section.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Political Research Quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129241263481","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Research on policy responsiveness to public opinion highlights differences owing to political institutions—both electoral and governmental. Electoral institutions that produce coalition governments tend to reduce responsiveness in between elections. Government institutions that divide powers horizontally, by contrast, appear to increase that responsiveness. These findings point to the role of institutional “friction” in shaping what governments do, though the two sources appear to produce different effects—one harmful and the other helpful. This paper explores this apparent contradiction. We revisit and clarify theoretical assumptions and outline alternative models of the effects of friction. Extending previous tests, now in 18 countries, we find clearer evidence supporting that earlier research and more firmly establish friction as the mechanism, particularly as regards the influence of electoral systems. The two institutional sources of friction appear to influence responsiveness in different ways, which has implications for politics and policy that we consider in the concluding section.
期刊介绍:
Political Research Quarterly (PRQ) is the official journal of the Western Political Science Association. PRQ seeks to publish scholarly research of exceptionally high merit that makes notable contributions in any subfield of political science. The editors especially encourage submissions that employ a mixture of theoretical approaches or multiple methodologies to address major political problems or puzzles at a local, national, or global level. Collections of articles on a common theme or debate, to be published as short symposia, are welcome as well as individual submissions.