Deadly ambiguities: NATO and the politics of counter-terrorism in international organizations after 9/11

Abstract

The article investigates the social making of counter-terrorism in international organizations (IOs). Discussing the literatures that emphasize the (in)coherence of multilateral counter-terrorism and the diversity of interests that interact and converge in these policies, the article highlights the determinants by which an object as vague and dissensual as post-9/11 counter-terrorism is ordered and stabilized within IOs. Therefore, the article provides an alternative sociological exploration of counter-terrorism in IOs by delving into the dynamics of frictions and power. Multilateral counter-terrorism is conceptualized as a socially grounded ‘constructive ambiguity’; the catch-all category of counter-terrorism is both a patent source of conflict among IOs’ players, who fight over its meaning, and a catalyser of minimal consensus. The article isolates two types of power structures in IOs that the ambiguity of counter-terrorism supports: domination and fragmentation. Additionally, the article demonstrates how ambiguities condition the conduct and evolution of IOs’ risk management security agenda. To do so, the article takes NATO’s post-9/11 trajectory as a case study and explores two different counter-terrorism policies related to counterinsurgency warfare in Afghanistan and maritime surveillance in the Mediterranean Sea.