Marta Biancardi, Michele Bufalo, Antonio Di Bari, Giovanni Villani
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
The need to obtain financial funds to pursue public utility investments implies the generation of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. The PPP framework can involve risk-sharing mechanisms between public administration and private sector to encourage private investors to fund these projects. However, these risk-sharing mechanisms, such as Minimum Revenue Guarantee or Revenue Cap (RC), could generate opportunistic behaviors. For this reason, we can set this problem as a game in which government and private investors would act as players. This paper proposes a mathematical model to evaluate the PPP projects through a combination of Game Theory (GT) and Real Options Approach (ROA). The ROA is needed to price the uncertainty that affects PPP investments, and the GT captures the strategic interactions between public and private sectors. A case study on a wastewater treatment project is developed to apply the model we proposed.
期刊介绍：
The Annals of Operations Research publishes peer-reviewed original articles dealing with key aspects of operations research, including theory, practice, and computation. The journal publishes full-length research articles, short notes, expositions and surveys, reports on computational studies, and case studies that present new and innovative practical applications.
In addition to regular issues, the journal publishes periodic special volumes that focus on defined fields of operations research, ranging from the highly theoretical to the algorithmic and the applied. These volumes have one or more Guest Editors who are responsible for collecting the papers and overseeing the refereeing process.
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