Can psychology learn from the natural sciences?

Abstract

I argue that psychology can learn from the natural sciences and focus on the weight that physics attributes to precise theories. Much of psychology can be increasingly characterized by theory aversion—yet not the kind motivated by positivism. Theory aversion in psychology arises from a conflict between two desires: to come up with a theory, and to avoid the necessary mental effort and time as well as the risk of refutation. The results are ersatz theories, or surrogates. I outline three common, but independent, research practices that avoid building precise theories of psychological processes: the null ritual, which allows researchers to get away with not specifying their research hypothesis; as-if theories, which refrain from modeling psychological processes; and lists of binary oppositions, as in dual-system theories, which consist of vague dichotomies. Psychologists could learn from physics to walk forward on two feet—theory and experiment—rather than hobble on one.