The Evolution of Price Discrimination in E-Commerce Platform Trading: A Perspective of Platform Corporate Social Responsibility

IF 5.1 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Ying Ma, Xiaodong Guo, Weihuan Su, Guo Fu
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The widespread use of data in e-commerce has facilitated the implementation of different pricing strategies for platforms and merchants. However, the excessive use of algorithms for differential pricing has sparked discussions about fairness and price discrimination, disrupting the platform trading system. To address this challenge, we adopt an evolutionary game approach to analyze the evolutionary strategies of all parties from the perspective of platform CSR. It is based on a special type of e-commerce platform trading in which major merchants have data analytics capabilities. We construct an evolutionary game model considering reputation and punishment, explore the impact of different situations and factors on the system’s evolutionary stability strategy, and conduct its verification via simulation experiments. The results show that long-term reputation is the internal driving force for platforms to fulfill responsibilities. The joint punishment of collusion is the external binding force. Consumer complaints are key to restricting merchants’ integrity operation. Moreover, penalties imposed by e-commerce platforms can help eradicate price discrimination. This study provides a new perspective to solve price discrimination in the digital era. Measures based on reputation and punishment can guide platforms to fulfill other social responsibilities.
电子商务平台交易中价格歧视的演变:平台企业社会责任视角
数据在电子商务中的广泛应用为平台和商家实施不同的定价策略提供了便利。然而,过度使用算法进行差别定价引发了有关公平性和价格歧视的讨论,扰乱了平台交易系统。为了应对这一挑战,我们采用了一种进化博弈方法,从平台企业社会责任的角度分析各方的进化策略。它基于一种特殊的电子商务平台交易,在这种交易中,主要商家都具有数据分析能力。我们构建了一个考虑声誉和惩罚的演化博弈模型,探讨了不同情况和因素对系统演化稳定策略的影响,并通过仿真实验进行了验证。结果表明,长期声誉是平台履行责任的内在驱动力。对合谋行为的联合惩罚是外部约束力。消费者投诉是制约商家诚信经营的关键。此外,电商平台的惩罚措施也有助于消除价格歧视。本研究为解决数字时代的价格歧视问题提供了一个新视角。基于声誉和惩罚的措施可以引导平台履行其他社会责任。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
9.50
自引率
3.60%
发文量
67
期刊介绍: The Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research (JTAER) has been created to allow researchers, academicians and other professionals an agile and flexible channel of communication in which to share and debate new ideas and emerging technologies concerned with this rapidly evolving field. Business practices, social, cultural and legal concerns, personal privacy and security, communications technologies, mobile connectivity are among the important elements of electronic commerce and are becoming ever more relevant in everyday life. JTAER will assist in extending and improving the use of electronic commerce for the benefit of our society.
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