{"title":"Robustness in binary-action supermodular games revisited","authors":"Daisuke Oyama, Satoru Takahashi","doi":"10.1007/s42973-024-00162-9","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We show that in all (whether generic or nongeneric) binary-action supermodular games, an extreme action profile is robust to incomplete information if and only if it is a monotone potential maximizer. The equivalence does not hold for nonextreme action profiles.</p>","PeriodicalId":516533,"journal":{"name":"The Japanese Economic Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Japanese Economic Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s42973-024-00162-9","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We show that in all (whether generic or nongeneric) binary-action supermodular games, an extreme action profile is robust to incomplete information if and only if it is a monotone potential maximizer. The equivalence does not hold for nonextreme action profiles.
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