Venture capital exit after venture IPO

IF 5.4 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Yong Li, Tailan Chi, Sai Lan, Qing Wang
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Abstract

Research SummaryVenture capital firms (VCs) sometimes continue to hold significant equity stakes in entrepreneurial ventures after venture IPO. The information economics view suggests that retaining equity signals VC commitment and venture quality. This study conceptualizes retaining equity as holding an exchange option, the option to exchange VCs' own valuation of IPO ventures for the market's valuation. Holding this option allows VCs to benefit from the ventures' upside potential. Since exit amounts to giving up the option, the option value represents an opportunity cost of exit. VCs may delay exit if this option is sufficiently valuable. The study examines two key conditions that interact to increase the value of this option: uncertainty and positive private information. This study contributes to research on VC exit and real options.Managerial SummaryWhen do VCs retain equity rather than exit after venture IPO? Researchers have addressed the impact of signaling, cash constraints, human capital constraints, blockholding, VC fund performance, portfolio diversification and institutional features. We identify a previously unrecognized driver: to retain the opportunity to benefit from an IPO venture's upside potential that is yet to be fully recognized or realized. We submit that VCs' incentive to retain equity increases with uncertainty in the venture's industry, and VCs' positive private information as indicated by venture patent applications and positive market surprises in the venture's industry. We find largely supportive evidence for the positive joint effect of uncertainty and private information on the decision to retain equity within the first year or even two years after IPO lockup expiration.
风险投资上市后的风险资本退出
研究摘要风险投资公司(VC)有时会在创业企业上市后继续持有大量股权。信息经济学认为,保留股权是风险投资承诺和风险投资质量的信号。本研究将保留股权概念化为持有交换期权,即用风险投资公司自己对首次公开募股风险企业的估值交换市场估值的期权。持有这种期权可以让风险投资公司从风险企业的上升潜力中获益。由于退出相当于放弃期权,期权价值代表了退出的机会成本。如果该期权有足够的价值,风险投资公司可能会推迟退出。本研究探讨了两个相互作用以提高该期权价值的关键条件:不确定性和积极的私人信息。本研究为风险投资公司退出和实物期权的研究做出了贡献。管理总结风险投资公司在风险企业首次公开募股后何时保留股权而不是退出?研究人员探讨了信号传递、现金约束、人力资本约束、大宗交易、风险投资基金业绩、投资组合多样化和机构特征等因素的影响。我们发现了一个以前未被认识到的驱动因素:保留从首次公开募股风险企业尚未被充分认识或实现的上升潜力中获益的机会。我们认为,风险投资人保留股权的动机会随着风险企业所在行业的不确定性以及风险投资人的积极私人信息(如风险企业的专利申请和风险企业所在行业的积极市场惊喜)而增加。我们发现,在首次公开募股锁定期满后的第一年甚至两年内,不确定性和私人信息共同对保留股权的决定产生了积极影响,这在很大程度上证明了这一点。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
11.10
自引率
1.60%
发文量
31
期刊介绍: The Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal is a research journal that publishes original work recommended by a developmental, double-blind review process conducted by peer scholars. Strategic entrepreneurship involves innovation and subsequent changes which add value to society and which change societal life in ways which have significant, sustainable, and durable consequences. The SEJ is international in scope and acknowledges theory- and evidence-based research conducted and/or applied in all regions of the world. It is devoted to content and quality standards based on scientific method, relevant theory, tested or testable propositions, and appropriate data and evidence, all replicable by others, and all representing original contributions. The SEJ values contributions which lead to improved practice of managing organizations as they deal with the entrepreneurial process involving imagination, insight, invention, and innovation and the inevitable changes and transformations that result and benefit society.
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