Beyond reasonable doubt: reconsidering Neanderthal aesthetic capacity

IF 2 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Andra Meneganzin, Anton Killin
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

An aesthetic sense—a taste for the creation and/or appreciation of that which strikes one as, e.g., attractive or awesome—is often assumed to be a distinctively H. sapiens phenomenon. However, recent paleoanthropological research is revealing its archaeologically visible, deeper roots. The sensorimotor/perceptual and cognitive capacities underpinning aesthetic activities are a major focus of evolutionary aesthetics. Here we take a diachronic, evolutionary perspective and assess ongoing scepticism regarding whether, and to what extent, aesthetic capacity extends to our evolutionary cousins, the Neanderthals. The goal of this article is twofold. First, it serves as a defence of the attribution of Neanderthal aesthetic capacity by marshalling archaeological data best explained by positing a Neanderthal aesthetic sense. Second, it offers an opportunity to make progress on understanding some epistemically relevant features of the wider debate in evolutionary aesthetics. First, we outline and analyse a range of distinct ‘sceptical arguments’ derived from attitudes and claims found in the literature and broader debate that aim to dial down the case for Neanderthal aesthetic capacity. We show that these arguments not only miss their target, they divert the debate away from more compelling questions. We then consider the case for protoaesthetic capacities and sensitivities in the Acheulean stone tool industry and argue that Neanderthals likely inherited the protoaesthetic package from ancient ancestors that they shared with H. sapiens. Finally, we sketch and defend a research agenda for framing Neanderthal aesthetic niche(s) beyond H. sapiens-derived standards, which we see as a priority for future archaeological, cognitive, and philosophical research. While we resist sceptical arguments and the often-implied inferiority of Neanderthals to humans, we also deny that Neanderthals and ancient humans were indistinguishable. Understanding the differences is an important goal of interpretation, and we apply this line of reasoning to the case of aesthetics.

Abstract Image

超越合理怀疑:重新考虑尼安德特人的审美能力
审美意识--一种创造和/或欣赏吸引人或令人惊叹的事物的品味--通常被认为是一种独特的智人现象。然而,最近的古人类学研究正在揭示其考古学上可见的、更深层次的根源。支撑审美活动的感觉运动/知觉和认知能力是进化美学的一个主要焦点。在此,我们将从非同步的进化角度出发,对目前关于审美能力是否以及在多大程度上延伸到我们的进化表亲尼安德特人的怀疑进行评估。本文有两个目的。首先,本文通过列举考古数据,为尼安德特人审美能力的归属进行辩护,尼安德特人的审美意识是对考古数据最好的解释。其次,这篇文章为我们提供了一个机会,让我们在理解进化美学广泛辩论中一些与认识论相关的特征方面取得进展。首先,我们概述并分析了一系列独特的 "怀疑论点",这些论点源自文献和广泛辩论中的态度和主张,旨在削弱尼安德特人审美能力的论据。我们表明,这些论点不仅没有击中目标,反而使辩论偏离了更有说服力的问题。然后,我们考虑了阿切乌拉石器工业中的原初审美能力和敏感性,并认为尼安德特人很可能从远古祖先那里继承了与智人共享的原初审美包。最后,我们勾勒出尼安德特人审美利基的研究议程,并为之辩护,我们认为这是未来考古学、认知学和哲学研究的当务之急。虽然我们抵制怀疑论和经常暗示的尼安德特人不如人类的说法,但我们也否认尼安德特人和古人类没有区别。理解差异是解释学的一个重要目标,我们将这一推理应用于美学。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.00
自引率
8.70%
发文量
72
期刊介绍: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences is an interdisciplinary, international journal that serves as a forum to explore the intersections between phenomenology, empirical science, and analytic philosophy of mind. The journal represents an attempt to build bridges between continental phenomenological approaches (in the tradition following Husserl) and disciplines that have not always been open to or aware of phenomenological contributions to understanding cognition and related topics. The journal welcomes contributions by phenomenologists, scientists, and philosophers who study cognition, broadly defined to include issues that are open to both phenomenological and empirical investigation, including perception, emotion, language, and so forth. In addition the journal welcomes discussions of methodological issues that involve the variety of approaches appropriate for addressing these problems.    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences also publishes critical review articles that address recent work in areas relevant to the connection between empirical results in experimental science and first-person perspective.Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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