Frontiers | “Zero-sum game” or “win-win cooperation”: an analysis of the evolution effect of competition neutrality based on the participation of four parties

IF 1.9 3区 物理与天体物理 Q2 PHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY
Yuqing Zhu, Mengyun Wu, Jie Lu
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Abstract

To effectively grasp the interactive evolution mechanism of relevant entities in the process of competitive neutrality and reveal the impact of the implementation effect of the principle of competitive neutrality on the evolution path of the game system is the key to guiding the development of the government, industry associations and enterprises with reasonable policies. The equilibrium point of the game is analyzed by the four-party evolutionary game model, and the influence of the change of relevant parameters on the evolution result of the game system is further simulated by numerical simulation. The results show that the central government supervision plays an important role in guiding the strategy selection of different game players. By raising the penalty standards for non-neutral competitive behavior of market players and increasing the non-neutral penalty for local governments, the system can evolve faster to the ideal state of “loose supervision by the central government, neutral implementation by local governments, strong supervision by industry associations, and active cooperation by enterprises.” Therefore, to improve the execution effect of competitive neutrality, the central government shall formulate a reasonable regulatory system, and to maximize inspire the enthusiasm of local government, industry associations and enterprises, to promote stability in the sustainable development of the market.
前沿 | "零和博弈 "还是 "合作共赢":基于四方参与的竞争中立演变效应分析
有效把握竞争中立过程中相关主体的互动演化机制,揭示竞争中立原则的实施效果对博弈系统演化路径的影响,是政府、行业协会和企业合理政策引导发展的关键。本文通过四方演化博弈模型分析了博弈的均衡点,并通过数值模拟进一步模拟了相关参数的变化对博弈系统演化结果的影响。结果表明,中央政府的监管对不同博弈方的策略选择起着重要的引导作用。通过提高对市场主体非中性竞争行为的惩罚标准,加大对地方政府的非中性惩罚力度,可以使博弈系统更快地演化到 "中央政府宽松监管、地方政府中性执行、行业协会强力监督、企业积极配合 "的理想状态。因此,为提高竞争中立的执行效果,中央政府应制定合理的监管制度,最大限度地激发地方政府、行业协会和企业的积极性,促进市场持续稳定发展。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Frontiers in Physics
Frontiers in Physics Mathematics-Mathematical Physics
CiteScore
4.50
自引率
6.50%
发文量
1215
审稿时长
12 weeks
期刊介绍: Frontiers in Physics publishes rigorously peer-reviewed research across the entire field, from experimental, to computational and theoretical physics. This multidisciplinary open-access journal is at the forefront of disseminating and communicating scientific knowledge and impactful discoveries to researchers, academics, engineers and the public worldwide.
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