Board composition, ownership structure and dividend policy: Evidence from NSE listed companies in India

IF 1.3 Q1 LAW
Jasmeet Kaur, Karamjeet Kaur
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Abstract

Purpose The purpose of the study is to analyse the influence of board composition and ownership structure on the dividend pay-out policy of selected listed Indian companies. Design/methodology/approach The top 30 companies listed on National Stock Exchange were examined for a period of three financial years from 2019 to 2021. Due to the cross-sectional and time-series character of the data, fixed effect panel model is used as the primary analytical approach. Findings The results revealed that there is a significant and positive association between board size and dividend policy. The results confirm that the firms with higher Indian ownership and non-institutional ownership distribute higher levels of dividend. No significant association was found between board independence and dividend decisions of ratios. Finally, it is observed that there is a positive impact of return on assets on dividend policy. Research limitations/implications Future studies can confirm the impact of ownership determinants and board characteristics on dividend distribution policy by taking stock dividends into account and enlarging the sample size of developing market businesses. They can also investigate ownership factors including management ownership and international ownership, in addition to other board attributes like qualification, tenure and age. This will offer a more thorough comprehension of how these variables relate to dividend policy. Practical implications Because they are better able to assess the financial position and make educated judgments, a diverse and independent board of directors may result in more strategic and cautious dividend policies. The dividend policy of a firm is also influenced by its ownership structure and strategic objectives; small or primary shareholders may exert pressure for larger payments. By focusing on long-term strategic goals rather than immediate requirements, managers may guarantee that interests are aligned. The findings of this study offer significant guidance to management and regulators about the dividend policy of publicly listed corporations. Social implications According to agency theory, the link between ownership structure, board composition and dividend policy may be explained by agency conflicts. Independent directors are necessary for the board to make decisions that effectively balance the interests of management and shareholders, particularly when it comes to paying dividends. According to studies, companies with non-executive directors have greater interest alignment and fewer agency issues. In addition, the ownership structure and makeup of the board are important factors in lowering agency conflicts and enhancing corporate governance procedures. Companies may improve their governance procedures and increase value for shareholders by resolving conflicts of interest. Originality/value The research paper contributes to the existing body of knowledge by analysing and uncovering significant and unknown relationship between board composition, ownership structure and dividend policy. The paper explores the relationship between specific ownership structures and dividend policy in context of a developing country where limited research exists and addresses a research question that has not been extensively studied before.
董事会组成、所有权结构和股利政策:印度 NSE 上市公司的证据
本研究旨在分析董事会组成和所有权结构对部分印度上市公司股利支付政策的影响。研究对象为在国家证券交易所上市的前 30 家公司,研究期限为 2019 年至 2021 年三个财政年度。由于数据具有横截面和时间序列的特点,因此采用固定效应面板模型作为主要分析方法。结果证实,印度所有权和非机构所有权较高的公司分配的股利水平较高。没有发现董事会独立性与股息比率决策之间有明显联系。研究局限/意义未来的研究可以通过考虑股票股利和扩大发展中市场企业的样本规模来证实所有权决定因素和董事会特征对股利分配政策的影响。除了资历、任期和年龄等董事会属性外,还可以调查所有权因素,包括管理层所有权和国际所有权。实际意义由于多元化和独立的董事会能够更好地评估财务状况并做出明智的判断,他们可能会制定更具战略性和更谨慎的股利政策。公司的股利政策还受其所有权结构和战略目标的影响;小股东或主要股东可能会施加压力,要求公司支付更多的股利。通过关注长期战略目标而非眼前需求,管理者可以保证利益一致。根据代理理论,所有权结构、董事会组成和股利政策之间的联系可以用代理冲突来解释。独立董事是董事会做出有效平衡管理层和股东利益的决策的必要条件,尤其是在支付股利时。研究表明,拥有非执行董事的公司利益一致性更高,代理问题更少。此外,所有权结构和董事会构成也是降低代理冲突和加强公司治理程序的重要因素。公司可以通过解决利益冲突来改善治理程序,为股东创造更多价值。本文以研究有限的发展中国家为背景,探讨了特定所有权结构与股利政策之间的关系,并解决了一个之前尚未广泛研究的问题。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.90
自引率
6.70%
发文量
13
期刊介绍: The International Journal of Law and Management is a leading journal addressing all aspects of regulation and law as they impact on organisational development, operations and leadership. Organisations and their leaders operate in an increasingly complex world of emerging regulation across national and international boundaries. The International Journal of Law and Management seeks to acknowledge the dynamics of that environment and provide a platform for articles and contributions to stimulate scholarly debate in the development of law and practice. The International Journal of Law and Management seeks to present the latest research on policy, practice and theoretical perspectives and their impact on the development and leadership of organisations. Contributions of a multi-disciplinary nature are welcome. Coverage includes, but is not limited to: -Employment and industrial law- Corporate governance and social responsibility- Intellectual property- Corporate law and finance- Insolvency- Commercial law and consumer protection- Environmental law- Taxation- Competition law- Regulatory theory
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