An experimental comparison of contributions in collective prevention games and public goods games

IF 16.4 1区 化学 Q1 CHEMISTRY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY
Véronique Flambard, Fabrice Le Lec, Rustam Romaniuc
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

In many collective action problems individuals' contributions increase the probability of a collectively favorable event rather than affect the quantity of public goods provided. Such problems, that we refer to as collective prevention games, remain largely unexplored in the literature. We fill this gap by setting up an experiment where subjects' contributions increase the probability of a fixed collective benefit or reduce the probability of a fixed negative externality. Our main result is a substantial increase in cooperation in the probabilistic loss environment compared to the deterministic one. We explore some behavioral mechanisms that could drive this result.

Abstract Image

集体预防博弈和公共物品博弈中贡献的实验比较
在许多集体行动问题中,个人的贡献会增加集体有利事件发生的概率,而不是影响所提供公共产品的数量。我们将这类问题称为集体预防博弈,但文献中对这类问题的研究在很大程度上仍然空白。我们通过实验填补了这一空白,在实验中,受试者的贡献会增加固定集体利益的概率,或减少固定负外部性的概率。我们的主要结果是,与确定性环境相比,概率损失环境中的合作大幅增加。我们探讨了一些可能导致这一结果的行为机制。
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来源期刊
Accounts of Chemical Research
Accounts of Chemical Research 化学-化学综合
CiteScore
31.40
自引率
1.10%
发文量
312
审稿时长
2 months
期刊介绍: Accounts of Chemical Research presents short, concise and critical articles offering easy-to-read overviews of basic research and applications in all areas of chemistry and biochemistry. These short reviews focus on research from the author’s own laboratory and are designed to teach the reader about a research project. In addition, Accounts of Chemical Research publishes commentaries that give an informed opinion on a current research problem. Special Issues online are devoted to a single topic of unusual activity and significance. Accounts of Chemical Research replaces the traditional article abstract with an article "Conspectus." These entries synopsize the research affording the reader a closer look at the content and significance of an article. Through this provision of a more detailed description of the article contents, the Conspectus enhances the article's discoverability by search engines and the exposure for the research.
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