Process choice under asymmetric competition with exogenous and endogenous product success probabilities

IF 9.8 1区 工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL
Yasemin Limon , Christopher S. Tang , Fehmi Tanrısever
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Abstract

To develop novel products in a competitive market, firms are under pressure to reduce their time-to-market by adopting a “concurrent process” that involves an upfront investment to speed up the process by conducting the final stage of development and production simultaneously. While the concurrent approach provides a time advantage, it involves a financial risk because, unlike the “sequential process” under which the production process will begin only after the new product passes the requisite tests, the firm cannot recoup the upfront production-related investment should the product fail the qualification or market test. Given this trade-off and the uncertain success of the product, should a firm adopt the concurrent process in a competitive market with asymmetric market shares and impatient consumers? Also, how would a firm’s development strategy change if the probability of product success can be controlled through research investments?

We provide a 2-stage (or 3-stage) duopoly game for the case when the product success probabilities are exogenously given (or endogenously determined). For both settings, in equilibrium, the concurrent process may be adopted by either one, both, or neither of the firms. Also, even when firms are symmetric, asymmetrical equilibria can emerge that have exactly one firm adopting the concurrent process. When the market-laggard firm has a higher exogenous success probability, a “catch-up” strategy can emerge that has the laggard firm adopt the concurrent process and the market-leading firm adopt the sequential process. This catch-up strategy cannot be sustained as a unique equilibrium when the success probabilities are endogenously determined.

在具有外生和内生产品成功概率的非对称竞争条件下的工艺选择
为了在竞争激烈的市场中开发新产品,企业面临着缩短产品上市时间的压力,它们需要采用 "并行流程",即预先投资,通过进行最后阶段的开发和生产来加快进程。虽然并行方法在时间上有优势,但也存在财务风险,因为与 "顺序流程 "不同,"顺序流程 "是在新产品通过必要测试后才开始生产流程,但如果产品未能通过资格或市场测试,企业就无法收回与生产相关的前期投资。考虑到这种权衡以及产品成功与否的不确定性,在市场份额不对称、消费者缺乏耐心的竞争市场中,企业是否应该采用并行流程?此外,如果可以通过研究投资来控制产品成功的概率,那么企业的开发战略会发生怎样的变化?
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
International Journal of Production Economics
International Journal of Production Economics 管理科学-工程:工业
CiteScore
21.40
自引率
7.50%
发文量
266
审稿时长
52 days
期刊介绍: The International Journal of Production Economics focuses on the interface between engineering and management. It covers all aspects of manufacturing and process industries, as well as production in general. The journal is interdisciplinary, considering activities throughout the product life cycle and material flow cycle. It aims to disseminate knowledge for improving industrial practice and strengthening the theoretical base for decision making. The journal serves as a forum for exchanging ideas and presenting new developments in theory and application, combining academic standards with practical value for industrial applications.
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