{"title":"Discrete-time stopping games with risk-sensitive discounted cost criterion","authors":"Wenzhao Zhang, Congying Liu","doi":"10.1007/s00186-024-00864-1","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we focus on the discrete-time stopping games under the risk-sensitive discounted cost criterion. The state space and the action spaces of all the players are assumed to be Borel spaces. The cost functions are allowed to be unbounded from above and from below. At each decision epoch, each player chooses an action to influence the transition laws, and player 1 incurs a running cost. If players 1 or 2 decides to stop the game, player 1 incurs a corresponding terminated cost. Under suitable hypothesis, we show that the game model has a value which is a unique solution of risk-sensitive stopping optimality equation by an approximation technique. Furthermore, we derive the existence of equilibria.</p>","PeriodicalId":49862,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Methods of Operations Research","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Mathematical Methods of Operations Research","FirstCategoryId":"100","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-024-00864-1","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"MATHEMATICS, APPLIED","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In this paper, we focus on the discrete-time stopping games under the risk-sensitive discounted cost criterion. The state space and the action spaces of all the players are assumed to be Borel spaces. The cost functions are allowed to be unbounded from above and from below. At each decision epoch, each player chooses an action to influence the transition laws, and player 1 incurs a running cost. If players 1 or 2 decides to stop the game, player 1 incurs a corresponding terminated cost. Under suitable hypothesis, we show that the game model has a value which is a unique solution of risk-sensitive stopping optimality equation by an approximation technique. Furthermore, we derive the existence of equilibria.
期刊介绍:
This peer reviewed journal publishes original and high-quality articles on important mathematical and computational aspects of operations research, in particular in the areas of continuous and discrete mathematical optimization, stochastics, and game theory. Theoretically oriented papers are supposed to include explicit motivations of assumptions and results, while application oriented papers need to contain substantial mathematical contributions. Suggestions for algorithms should be accompanied with numerical evidence for their superiority over state-of-the-art methods. Articles must be of interest for a large audience in operations research, written in clear and correct English, and typeset in LaTeX. A special section contains invited tutorial papers on advanced mathematical or computational aspects of operations research, aiming at making such methodologies accessible for a wider audience.
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