For a contextualist and content-related understanding of the difference between human and artificial intelligence

IF 2 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Veronica Cibotaru
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The development of artificial intelligence necessarily implies the anthropological question of the difference between human and artificial intelligence for two reasons: on the one hand artificial intelligence tends to be conceived on the model of human intelligence, on the other hand, a large part of types of artificial intelligence are designed in order to exhibit at least some features of what is conceived as being human intelligence. In this article I address this anthropological question in two parts. First I bring into review and classify some of the main answers that have been proposed until now to this question. I argue that these variety of answers can be broadly classified in three categories, namely a (1) behaviorist, (2) a representational, and (3) a holistic understanding of human intelligence. In a second moment I propose an alternative way of understanding the difference between human and artificial intelligence, which is not essentialist but contextualist and content-related. Contrary to possible answers that I analyse in the first section, this alternative model does not aim at grasping the essence of human intelligence, which could or could not be reproduced in principle by artificial intelligence. It situates rather the fundamental differences between human and artificial intelligence in the context of human existence and the conceptual content of human intelligence, following the phenomenological description of one of its most fundamental features, namely its life-world. Grounding on this approach, it is possible to argue that human and artificial intelligence could be by distinct, even if one could prove that they are eidetically, i.e. by their essence, identical.

从情境和内容角度理解人类智能与人工智能的区别
人工智能的发展必然意味着人类智能与人工智能之间的区别这一人类学问题,原因有二:一方面,人工智能倾向于按照人类智能的模式来构想;另一方面,很大一部分人工智能类型的设计都是为了至少表现出人类智能的某些特征。在本文中,我将分两部分探讨这个人类学问题。首先,我将对迄今为止针对这一问题提出的一些主要答案进行回顾和分类。我认为,这些答案大致可分为三类,即(1) 行为主义,(2) 表象主义,(3) 对人类智慧的整体理解。其次,我提出了另一种理解人类智能与人工智能区别的方法,这种方法不是本质主义的,而是情境主义的,是与内容相关的。与我在第一节中分析的可能答案相反,这种替代模式并不旨在把握人类智能的本质,因为人类智能原则上可以或不可以由人工智能复制。相反,它将人类智能与人工智能之间的根本区别置于人类生存的背景和人类智能的概念内容之中,遵循对人类智能最基本特征之一,即其生活世界的现象学描述。基于这种方法,我们可以说,人类智能和人工智能是截然不同的,即使我们可以证明它们在本质上是相同的。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.00
自引率
8.70%
发文量
72
期刊介绍: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences is an interdisciplinary, international journal that serves as a forum to explore the intersections between phenomenology, empirical science, and analytic philosophy of mind. The journal represents an attempt to build bridges between continental phenomenological approaches (in the tradition following Husserl) and disciplines that have not always been open to or aware of phenomenological contributions to understanding cognition and related topics. The journal welcomes contributions by phenomenologists, scientists, and philosophers who study cognition, broadly defined to include issues that are open to both phenomenological and empirical investigation, including perception, emotion, language, and so forth. In addition the journal welcomes discussions of methodological issues that involve the variety of approaches appropriate for addressing these problems.    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences also publishes critical review articles that address recent work in areas relevant to the connection between empirical results in experimental science and first-person perspective.Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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