{"title":"Anthropomorphizing Machines: Reality or Popular Myth?","authors":"Simon Coghlan","doi":"10.1007/s11023-024-09686-w","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to a widespread view, people often anthropomorphize machines such as certain robots and computer and AI systems by erroneously attributing mental states to them. On this view, people almost irresistibly believe, even if only subconsciously, that machines with certain human-like features really have phenomenal or subjective experiences like sadness, happiness, desire, pain, joy, and distress, even though they lack such feelings. This paper questions this view by critiquing common arguments used to support it and by suggesting an alternative explanation. Even if people’s behavior and language regarding human-like machines suggests they believe those machines really have mental states, it is possible that they do not believe that at all. The paper also briefly discusses potential implications of regarding such anthropomorphism as a popular myth. The exercise illuminates the difficult concept of anthropomorphism, helping to clarify possible human relations with or toward machines that increasingly resemble humans and animals.</p>","PeriodicalId":51133,"journal":{"name":"Minds and Machines","volume":"79 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Minds and Machines","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-024-09686-w","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
According to a widespread view, people often anthropomorphize machines such as certain robots and computer and AI systems by erroneously attributing mental states to them. On this view, people almost irresistibly believe, even if only subconsciously, that machines with certain human-like features really have phenomenal or subjective experiences like sadness, happiness, desire, pain, joy, and distress, even though they lack such feelings. This paper questions this view by critiquing common arguments used to support it and by suggesting an alternative explanation. Even if people’s behavior and language regarding human-like machines suggests they believe those machines really have mental states, it is possible that they do not believe that at all. The paper also briefly discusses potential implications of regarding such anthropomorphism as a popular myth. The exercise illuminates the difficult concept of anthropomorphism, helping to clarify possible human relations with or toward machines that increasingly resemble humans and animals.
期刊介绍:
Minds and Machines, affiliated with the Society for Machines and Mentality, serves as a platform for fostering critical dialogue between the AI and philosophical communities. With a focus on problems of shared interest, the journal actively encourages discussions on the philosophical aspects of computer science.
Offering a global forum, Minds and Machines provides a space to debate and explore important and contentious issues within its editorial focus. The journal presents special editions dedicated to specific topics, invites critical responses to previously published works, and features review essays addressing current problem scenarios.
By facilitating a diverse range of perspectives, Minds and Machines encourages a reevaluation of the status quo and the development of new insights. Through this collaborative approach, the journal aims to bridge the gap between AI and philosophy, fostering a tradition of critique and ensuring these fields remain connected and relevant.