Memory without identity

IF 1.4 3区哲学 Q2 ETHICS

Philosophical Psychology Pub Date : 2024-06-17 DOI:10.1080/09515089.2024.2367077

Daniel Morgan

引用次数: 0

Abstract

I defend the view that episodic memory judgments do not depend on any kind of identification of oneself as the person whose past is being remembered, and are therefore logically (rather than merely...

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没有身份的记忆

我的辩护观点是，外显记忆判断并不依赖于对自己作为过去被记忆者的任何形式的认同，因此在逻辑上（而不仅仅是......

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来源期刊

Philosophical Psychology Multiple-

CiteScore

2.40

自引率

14.30%

发文量

120

期刊介绍： Philosophical Psychology is an international journal devoted to developing and strengthening the links between philosophy and the psychological sciences, both as basic sciences and as employed in applied settings, by publishing original, peer-refereed contributions to this expanding field of study and research. Published articles deal with issues that arise in the cognitive and brain sciences, and in areas of applied psychology.