State-led versus market-led: How institutional arrangements impact collaborative governance in participatory urban regeneration in China

Abstract

Both state-led and market-led institutional arrangements have been experimented in China to form collaborative governance among diverse stakeholders in participatory urban regeneration. Relatively less is known about how institutional arrangements as structural constraints impact the formation of collaborative governance. Building upon Giddens' structuration theory and collaborative governance theory, this paper develops a novel framework that converges on the reciprocity between structural and agency elements and applies it to two residential regeneration cases in Shenzhen. The findings reveal that in residential regeneration, the state-led institutional structure has a greater capacity than the market-led structure to create relational links for community participation. Various factors, including variations in land property rights, path dependencies and institutional certainties, explain the findings. The formation of collaborative governance relies on the shaping effect of structural elements on agents' behaviors in institutional design, including not only well-designed rules to regulate sanctions, constitute common meaning and allocate resources proportionally to actors' responsibilities, but also premium-allocated resources in accordance with stakeholders’ responsibilities. These findings contribute to a better understanding of collaborative governance and help improve participatory urban regeneration policymaking in China.