Agriculture and food in the West Bank after October 7, 2023

IF 1.3 Q3 AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS & POLICY
Omar Qassis
{"title":"Agriculture and food in the West Bank after October 7, 2023","authors":"Omar Qassis","doi":"10.1111/cuag.12318","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>The situation of agriculture in the West Bank since October 7, 2023 is a continuation of an ongoing process of destruction, confiscation, and enclosure witnessed prior to that date. The Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture (<span>2024</span>) estimates that the total damage to Palestinian farmers and herders from October 7 to December 31, 2023 has been US$ 22,585,410. Many of the issues farmers in the West Bank are currently facing are only slight variations on a theme of persistent violence that they have endured for decades, but the more marked shift is in the pace of change since October 7. Dozens, if not hundreds, of communities are suddenly at risk of displacement, while in some places displaced peoples are already numbering in the thousands. The agricultural forms that sustain the most livelihoods in the West Bank are oleo-culture and herding, both of which have been central targets by the Israeli army and settlers.</p><p>This most recent colonial aggression is not an aberration but rather a continuation of the settler program in Palestine. What is happening in the West Bank today cannot be compared to the scale of devastation in Gaza, but that speaks more to the horrors occurring in Gaza. The extent of settler attacks, settlement expansion, army incursions, clashes, and assassinations of youth that have occurred in the West Bank since October 7 has not been seen since the 2000–2005 Second Intifada. Meanwhile, rapid decreases in access to land, water, and income are eroding people's ability to sustain themselves and their families.</p><p>As a Mediterranean country, Palestine is composed of several micro-regions. The West Bank starts from its western end at elevations of 200 m above sea level and reaches over 1000 m in several places. East of the hills is the Jordan Valley, which drops to 276 m below sea level at the city of Jericho. The Jordan Valley is the vegetable basket of the West Bank, where the villages and Jericho have ample irrigated agriculture, while Bedouins inhabit the area between the irrigated lands and the hills in its north–south stretch. To the west and north of the hills are the coastal plains, which make up the districts of Qalqilya, Tulkarim, and Jenin, which together are the site of over 50% of national olive oil production. To the south of the hills are the fringes of the Naqab desert, represented by the city of Hebron and its many populous towns. Hebron produces most of the West Bank's grapes and grape products and is where much of the country's herding activities take place.</p><p>As part of the 1994 Oslo Peace Process, the West Bank was divided along different lines of control, with Area A being under Palestinian administrative and security control, Area B under Palestinian administrative and Israeli security control, and Area C under Israeli administrative and security control. These arrangements were meant to be only temporary until a more comprehensive peace agreement could be reached. However, permanent peace never materialized and the temporary arrangements became “the status quo.” Area A contains most of the cities in the West Bank, whereas Area C, which is roughly 60% of the West Bank, contains most of the agricultural lands and natural resources.</p><p>The olive tree has long been a central pillar of the agricultural economy in Palestine. The 2023 harvest was interrupted by the most recent onslaught. It is difficult to accurately estimate losses due to the biennial nature of olive production, yet 2023s 10,000 tons pales in comparison with 2022s 36,000 and 2021s 17,000 tons. UN-OCHA noted the loss of roughly 1200 metric tons of olive oil in the 2023 season resulting in a direct financial setback of US$ 10 million (UN-OCHA, <span>2024</span>). Additionally, around 10% of olive presses did not open this year compared with the previous 2 years, due to the closure of roads and the difficulty of reaching mills.</p><p>Prior to the 1948 Nakbeh (catastrophe), Palestine was home to nearly 6 million olive trees (Al-Taher, <span>1947</span>). Although the West Bank only makes up 22% of historic Palestine, today it is home to roughly 10 million fruit-bearing olive trees. Across the Palestinian territories, olive trees make up 85% of the fruit trees and take up 54% of the arable land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Olives contribute to the livelihood of 80,000–100,000 Palestinian families and make up 4.6% of the GDP (World Bank, <span>2018</span>).</p><p>The main reason behind the expansion of olive culture in the period from 1967 to present is land defense. After the 1967 occupation of the West Bank, military authorities justified the confiscation of land by claiming that it was “unused.” Olives require little care compared to field crops, and many local cultivars are drought and disease resistant, making them ideal candidates in the struggle of land defense. They ensured people's livelihoods while protecting the land made the expansion of oleo-culture in uncertain times a form of social protection. Millions were planted as part of volunteer drives by youth in the 1970s and 1980s. International aid has played a role in the expansion of olive planting as well, with the 1948–1967 period seeing expansion in terraced agriculture and oleo-culture financed by the British government as a means of income generation for newly created refugees (Reger, <span>2018</span>). Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994, several government programs have worked to expand land defense via oleo-culture, supplemented by donor intervention aimed at increasing productivity and profitability.</p><p>Given the role of the olive sector in producing food, income, and land protection, it is no wonder the Israeli army and settlers target it so systematically. UN-OCHA estimated that from 1967 to 2011, over 800,000 olive trees were uprooted, while the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture and Central Bureau of Statistics documented more than 278,000 olive trees that were completely or partially destroyed between 2010 and 2023. Combining these numbers and accounting for the double counting of the years 2010–2011, we find the olive tree casualty rate of over a million trees since the start of the occupation in the West Bank. The 2023 yearly report from the Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission documented 379 attacks against the West Bank in 2023, with olive trees making up just under 19,000 of the 21,731 trees that were destroyed, or nearly 90%. It is safe to assume that these statistics are the tip of the iceberg.</p><p>Bedouin communities inhabit the Jordan Valley in the East, and herder communities live in the south of Hebron in the area surrounding the town of Yatta. Bedouins are historically misrepresented as communities that do not farm. However, they did and still do farm alongside their herding activities. Often enough, the farming they do is to support their herds. Both Bedouins in the Jordan Valleys and herders in the Masafir Yatta have had their homes and livelihoods threatened for some time now.</p><p>The Bedouin communities of the Jordan Valley numbered 3000 families in 2016, of which about 18 different tribes inhabit the “E1” pass which Israeli authorities continually attempt to depopulate. More than 40% of Bedouin communities are denied electricity infrastructure, while in terms of water access, Bedouins have access to 20 L of water per day, compared to the 300 L/day the nearby settlers have access to (UNDP, <span>2017</span>). The destruction wrought by the army and settlers during the 2016–2017 period led to 84% of the Bedouin and Palestinian herders in the West Bank requiring assistance, with roughly 55% being food insecure. Settler violence is a major issue in these areas. Prior to October 7, an average of three settler attacks per day occurred in the West Bank. Since October 7, the number has risen to an average of seven attacks per day (UN-OCHA, <span>2023</span>).</p><p>The formation of right-wing coalitions in the Israeli government escalated the difficult situation of communities even further after 2018. Since then, the phrase “pastoral colonization” (al-istitan al-ra'awi [الاستيطان الرعو]) has entered the Arabic lexicon. In the Jordan Valley, the work of these “settler cowboys” has centered around enclosing water sources. The enclosure of water sources is worthy of special attention. In the last 25–30 years many springs dried up due to climate change and landscape changes created by settlements and the ABC zoning. In the last 5 years, 70%–80% of springs were enclosed and fell under complete Israeli control. The remainder of the springs are also under Israeli control but allow partial entry at certain times to herders. In the Jordan Valley, at least 16 Bedouin communities have been completely displaced since October 7th, with water scarcity being a central reason.</p><p>Where enclosure to pastures might be offset with government or NGO assistance and/or the temporary purchase of fodder, the amount and scale of water needs make it much more costly and an intervention that is needed more often. The targeting of water tankers and silos only exacerbates the problem. Heat in the Jordan Valley is arid, with summer temperatures averaging 36°C and climate change-induced heat waves reaching temperatures as high as 46°C in 2023. With the coming summer heat, those who cannot secure water for their herds will be forced to sell or move. Many communities have already had to make this choice, but the scale of herd sales has yet to be seen due to difficulty of reporting, a point discussed in more detail below.</p><p>Since October 7, settler cowboys have moved on to directly targeting and destroying agricultural machinery, irrigation pipes, and water tanks, as well as injuring, confiscating, or releasing the herds of community members in the area, and they often threaten and even shoot community members. It seems that where once the settlers assisted the army when carrying out these tasks, since October 7, the settlers dressed in their reserve fatigues and carried out these attacks directly.</p><p>Cowboy-militia attacks are reported more often in the Masafir Yatta, where private Palestinian lands are being openly confiscated and enclosed. Herding by Palestinians has been restricted to a 100-m radius from community centers, all while water infrastructure and water tankers continue to be damaged and destroyed. Settler shepherds are pasturing their livestock on lands planted with wheat and barley by Palestinian farmers. Settlers are putting up tents and caravans on hilltops in the Masafir and connecting these caravans with roads, which disconnect and isolate small Palestinian communities.</p><p>Those familiar with the work of Alfred Crosby (<span>2004</span>) on ecological imperialism will not be shocked to discover similar settler tactics in landscape shaping of the West Bank. Where settler cowboys graze caprine along the semi-desert fringes of the Masafir, in the rest of the West Bank it is predominantly cattle. These literal settler cowboys graze their cattle while armed with Ozi's and AR15's instead of the Henry Repeating Rifle or the Winchester often seen in old westerns. The cattle are allowed to treat Palestinian grain fields, olive groves, and terraced lands as open grazing areas, destroying trees and crops as they go. Unlike sheep and goat herds, herding large cattle in this landscape quickly leads to overgrazing and results in loss of surface cover, enabling erosion, which is exacerbating desertification throughout the West Bank.</p><p>In addition to the effects of overgrazing, cattle are notorious for trampling and damaging or destroying stone terraces. These terraces have been referred to as the pyramids of Palestine due to the amount of labor that went into erecting them throughout the hill regions. Their role is central in preserving not just topsoil but moisture. In the region's semi-arid climate, up to 60% of rainwater is lost to evaporation. Terraces force water underground and trap essential moisture. Studies on the impact of terraces on olive culture have shown that trees with erected terraces protecting them produce 10%–15% more oil. Decreasing soil moisture, increasing temperatures, and enclosures preventing goats from grazing combine to create the ticking timebombs of wildfires. The water retention enabled by terraces recharges groundwater aquifers and/or creates springs, depending on the geography of the area. The long-term impact of cattle could be to decrease access to water for everyone who relies on it.<sup>1</sup></p><p>Where settler cowboys and their cattle are the main force of ecological invasion, wild boars are the shock troops. Virtually nonexistent in the mountains of the West Bank prior to the 1980s, wild boar has populated the hills and increased their numbers as a result of Israeli Civil Affairs (ICA) conservation policies that have made it illegal for Palestinians to shoot them. While human rights organizations have yet to document it, dozens of citizen reports across the last two decades claim settlers intentionally release wild boar into Palestinians agricultural areas. The largest casualty of boar advances is triticulture or wheat production in the West Bank hills, which has almost completely disappeared where they roam (see Amira, <span>2021</span>). Over the last few decades, boars have been able to benefit from interrelated processes: ICA-designated conservation parks where these boars populate; pine trees planted by the Jewish National Fund, which are ideal congregation points for wild boars; and ICA culling bans and settler attacks on agricultural communities. In the summer heat, boars driven by thirst enter population areas and target water tanks and irrigation drips, and they have been known to dig under fencing or bring down rock walls to get to a water source. They continue to damage green houses, gardens, fields, and groves and have injured and killed people who fall along their path.</p><p>As noted above, Area C makes up 60% of the West Bank and contains most of its agricultural land and natural resources. It is subject to Israeli security and administrative control, yet services and essential infrastructure are financed largely by either intergovernmental organizations, donor states, or the PA and are implemented by NGOs and local government units. The ability of civil organizations to function has decreased exponentially in the last decade (and most acutely since 2018). A central reason for this is impediments created by settler organizations.</p><p>Ragavim and NGO Monitor are two settler organizations that have worked to speed the pace of colonial eliminatory rhythms (Ghantous &amp; Joronen, <span>2022</span>). NGO Monitor started harassing donors of organizations operating in Area C in 2018 with a campaign to cut the funding of Maan Development Center, which was temporarily successful. Ragavim meanwhile targeted the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC) from as early as 2014, and in 2018 affirmed targeting “the main organisation involved in agricultural projects in Area C” (White, <span>2020</span>). That this targeting reached five other rights organizations whose work focused on challenging the settler state should come as no surprise. Unfortunately, this second wave was more successful and several of these organizations have not been able to regain their prior strength (and funding). Among much other work, Maan and UAWC operate mainly in Area C. Maan is one of Palestine's oldest environmental organizations and has worked tirelessly for decades to ban carcinogenic pesticides. The UAWC is the only organization that preserves indigenous seeds (i.e., Baladi seeds) in its seed bank.</p><p>The attacks on these essential organizations were a rehearsal for what has happened since October 7. Claims of ties to terrorism get lobbed, and donors withdraw their funds when interventions are most needed. The European Union's rash recent decision to freeze aid funding to the West Bank demonstrates the chilling success of these tactics. Yet the evidence provided is all the more worrying, especially considering how willing most European donor states are to give legibility to Israeli claims when torture of prisoners and extraction of false confessions by the Israeli government is well documented (Addameer, <span>n.d.</span>; OHCHR, <span>2021</span>).</p><p>The freezing of UNRWA funding when mass starvation is at Gaza's doors is arguably as criminal as the siege itself. Yet there seems to have been a sleight of hand in the funding landscape as well. Many projects canceled during the funding freeze were not reinstated but rather the money was diverted to humanitarian response, leaving vulnerable communities in Area C at the mercy of settler cowboys. UN-OCHA, the Colonization and Wall Resistance Committee (CWRC), and B'tselem seem to be actively documenting the situation. Yet they are not structured any different from UNRWA, the PA, and Palestinian NGOs, and hence are prone to being targeted by settler organizations—and indeed often are.</p><p>The throttling of work and income has also been leveraged against Palestinians. West Bank Palestinian laborers who work inside the Green Line had their permits suspended after October 7, leading to a jump from 14% to 30% unemployment. This increase is due to 150,000–180,000 Palestinians working in settlements and Israeli cities, roughly 75% of whom have not been permitted to return to work since (Bajec, <span>2024</span>). Since October 7, the Israeli government has started deducting tax revenue collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority, and public sector employees are receiving as low as 50% of their wages some months. Public sector employees number roughly 165,000–185,000 people, with the West Bank constituting roughly 140,000 of them. In addition to the above, the increase in checkpoints is increasing the cost of transport within the West Bank, raising food costs. Finally, tourism constitutes an important source of income in some cities, especially Bethlehem, Jerusalem, and Jericho, an industry that has all but ceased to operate since October 7.</p><p>The largest employers in the West Bank are the PA, employment in Israeli construction and agriculture sectors, and civil society organizations. That all three sources are subject to cuts shows the high level of dependency created by the Oslo Accords and the real-life impact of collective punishment. In short, the squeeze put on Palestinian society in the West Bank since October 7 has aimed at punishing the middle and working classes, targeting their access to food and water, their livelihoods, and their ways of life. How much longer the pressure can hold without an ensuing explosion is not clear. What is clear is that a lot of people have less income at a time when the price of food is rising and that the dynamics of culture, politics, labor, food, and the environment are inextricably linked.</p><p>To conclude, it is important to note the discourse of blame and responsibility that is starting to circulate. This pertains particularly to the scapegoating of Netanyahu's premiership and right-wing governing coalitions. While certainly there are some unique characteristics to the current government, the fundamental fact is that the settler colonization of Palestine has continued regardless of who sits on what chair in the Knesset. The <i>intention</i> to replace the native population has been in the planning from the start. Now more than ever, Patrick Wolfe's maxim that “invasion is a structure not an event” holds true.</p>","PeriodicalId":54150,"journal":{"name":"Culture Agriculture Food and Environment","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/cuag.12318","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Culture Agriculture Food and Environment","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cuag.12318","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS & POLICY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

The situation of agriculture in the West Bank since October 7, 2023 is a continuation of an ongoing process of destruction, confiscation, and enclosure witnessed prior to that date. The Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture (2024) estimates that the total damage to Palestinian farmers and herders from October 7 to December 31, 2023 has been US$ 22,585,410. Many of the issues farmers in the West Bank are currently facing are only slight variations on a theme of persistent violence that they have endured for decades, but the more marked shift is in the pace of change since October 7. Dozens, if not hundreds, of communities are suddenly at risk of displacement, while in some places displaced peoples are already numbering in the thousands. The agricultural forms that sustain the most livelihoods in the West Bank are oleo-culture and herding, both of which have been central targets by the Israeli army and settlers.

This most recent colonial aggression is not an aberration but rather a continuation of the settler program in Palestine. What is happening in the West Bank today cannot be compared to the scale of devastation in Gaza, but that speaks more to the horrors occurring in Gaza. The extent of settler attacks, settlement expansion, army incursions, clashes, and assassinations of youth that have occurred in the West Bank since October 7 has not been seen since the 2000–2005 Second Intifada. Meanwhile, rapid decreases in access to land, water, and income are eroding people's ability to sustain themselves and their families.

As a Mediterranean country, Palestine is composed of several micro-regions. The West Bank starts from its western end at elevations of 200 m above sea level and reaches over 1000 m in several places. East of the hills is the Jordan Valley, which drops to 276 m below sea level at the city of Jericho. The Jordan Valley is the vegetable basket of the West Bank, where the villages and Jericho have ample irrigated agriculture, while Bedouins inhabit the area between the irrigated lands and the hills in its north–south stretch. To the west and north of the hills are the coastal plains, which make up the districts of Qalqilya, Tulkarim, and Jenin, which together are the site of over 50% of national olive oil production. To the south of the hills are the fringes of the Naqab desert, represented by the city of Hebron and its many populous towns. Hebron produces most of the West Bank's grapes and grape products and is where much of the country's herding activities take place.

As part of the 1994 Oslo Peace Process, the West Bank was divided along different lines of control, with Area A being under Palestinian administrative and security control, Area B under Palestinian administrative and Israeli security control, and Area C under Israeli administrative and security control. These arrangements were meant to be only temporary until a more comprehensive peace agreement could be reached. However, permanent peace never materialized and the temporary arrangements became “the status quo.” Area A contains most of the cities in the West Bank, whereas Area C, which is roughly 60% of the West Bank, contains most of the agricultural lands and natural resources.

The olive tree has long been a central pillar of the agricultural economy in Palestine. The 2023 harvest was interrupted by the most recent onslaught. It is difficult to accurately estimate losses due to the biennial nature of olive production, yet 2023s 10,000 tons pales in comparison with 2022s 36,000 and 2021s 17,000 tons. UN-OCHA noted the loss of roughly 1200 metric tons of olive oil in the 2023 season resulting in a direct financial setback of US$ 10 million (UN-OCHA, 2024). Additionally, around 10% of olive presses did not open this year compared with the previous 2 years, due to the closure of roads and the difficulty of reaching mills.

Prior to the 1948 Nakbeh (catastrophe), Palestine was home to nearly 6 million olive trees (Al-Taher, 1947). Although the West Bank only makes up 22% of historic Palestine, today it is home to roughly 10 million fruit-bearing olive trees. Across the Palestinian territories, olive trees make up 85% of the fruit trees and take up 54% of the arable land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Olives contribute to the livelihood of 80,000–100,000 Palestinian families and make up 4.6% of the GDP (World Bank, 2018).

The main reason behind the expansion of olive culture in the period from 1967 to present is land defense. After the 1967 occupation of the West Bank, military authorities justified the confiscation of land by claiming that it was “unused.” Olives require little care compared to field crops, and many local cultivars are drought and disease resistant, making them ideal candidates in the struggle of land defense. They ensured people's livelihoods while protecting the land made the expansion of oleo-culture in uncertain times a form of social protection. Millions were planted as part of volunteer drives by youth in the 1970s and 1980s. International aid has played a role in the expansion of olive planting as well, with the 1948–1967 period seeing expansion in terraced agriculture and oleo-culture financed by the British government as a means of income generation for newly created refugees (Reger, 2018). Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994, several government programs have worked to expand land defense via oleo-culture, supplemented by donor intervention aimed at increasing productivity and profitability.

Given the role of the olive sector in producing food, income, and land protection, it is no wonder the Israeli army and settlers target it so systematically. UN-OCHA estimated that from 1967 to 2011, over 800,000 olive trees were uprooted, while the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture and Central Bureau of Statistics documented more than 278,000 olive trees that were completely or partially destroyed between 2010 and 2023. Combining these numbers and accounting for the double counting of the years 2010–2011, we find the olive tree casualty rate of over a million trees since the start of the occupation in the West Bank. The 2023 yearly report from the Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission documented 379 attacks against the West Bank in 2023, with olive trees making up just under 19,000 of the 21,731 trees that were destroyed, or nearly 90%. It is safe to assume that these statistics are the tip of the iceberg.

Bedouin communities inhabit the Jordan Valley in the East, and herder communities live in the south of Hebron in the area surrounding the town of Yatta. Bedouins are historically misrepresented as communities that do not farm. However, they did and still do farm alongside their herding activities. Often enough, the farming they do is to support their herds. Both Bedouins in the Jordan Valleys and herders in the Masafir Yatta have had their homes and livelihoods threatened for some time now.

The Bedouin communities of the Jordan Valley numbered 3000 families in 2016, of which about 18 different tribes inhabit the “E1” pass which Israeli authorities continually attempt to depopulate. More than 40% of Bedouin communities are denied electricity infrastructure, while in terms of water access, Bedouins have access to 20 L of water per day, compared to the 300 L/day the nearby settlers have access to (UNDP, 2017). The destruction wrought by the army and settlers during the 2016–2017 period led to 84% of the Bedouin and Palestinian herders in the West Bank requiring assistance, with roughly 55% being food insecure. Settler violence is a major issue in these areas. Prior to October 7, an average of three settler attacks per day occurred in the West Bank. Since October 7, the number has risen to an average of seven attacks per day (UN-OCHA, 2023).

The formation of right-wing coalitions in the Israeli government escalated the difficult situation of communities even further after 2018. Since then, the phrase “pastoral colonization” (al-istitan al-ra'awi [الاستيطان الرعو]) has entered the Arabic lexicon. In the Jordan Valley, the work of these “settler cowboys” has centered around enclosing water sources. The enclosure of water sources is worthy of special attention. In the last 25–30 years many springs dried up due to climate change and landscape changes created by settlements and the ABC zoning. In the last 5 years, 70%–80% of springs were enclosed and fell under complete Israeli control. The remainder of the springs are also under Israeli control but allow partial entry at certain times to herders. In the Jordan Valley, at least 16 Bedouin communities have been completely displaced since October 7th, with water scarcity being a central reason.

Where enclosure to pastures might be offset with government or NGO assistance and/or the temporary purchase of fodder, the amount and scale of water needs make it much more costly and an intervention that is needed more often. The targeting of water tankers and silos only exacerbates the problem. Heat in the Jordan Valley is arid, with summer temperatures averaging 36°C and climate change-induced heat waves reaching temperatures as high as 46°C in 2023. With the coming summer heat, those who cannot secure water for their herds will be forced to sell or move. Many communities have already had to make this choice, but the scale of herd sales has yet to be seen due to difficulty of reporting, a point discussed in more detail below.

Since October 7, settler cowboys have moved on to directly targeting and destroying agricultural machinery, irrigation pipes, and water tanks, as well as injuring, confiscating, or releasing the herds of community members in the area, and they often threaten and even shoot community members. It seems that where once the settlers assisted the army when carrying out these tasks, since October 7, the settlers dressed in their reserve fatigues and carried out these attacks directly.

Cowboy-militia attacks are reported more often in the Masafir Yatta, where private Palestinian lands are being openly confiscated and enclosed. Herding by Palestinians has been restricted to a 100-m radius from community centers, all while water infrastructure and water tankers continue to be damaged and destroyed. Settler shepherds are pasturing their livestock on lands planted with wheat and barley by Palestinian farmers. Settlers are putting up tents and caravans on hilltops in the Masafir and connecting these caravans with roads, which disconnect and isolate small Palestinian communities.

Those familiar with the work of Alfred Crosby (2004) on ecological imperialism will not be shocked to discover similar settler tactics in landscape shaping of the West Bank. Where settler cowboys graze caprine along the semi-desert fringes of the Masafir, in the rest of the West Bank it is predominantly cattle. These literal settler cowboys graze their cattle while armed with Ozi's and AR15's instead of the Henry Repeating Rifle or the Winchester often seen in old westerns. The cattle are allowed to treat Palestinian grain fields, olive groves, and terraced lands as open grazing areas, destroying trees and crops as they go. Unlike sheep and goat herds, herding large cattle in this landscape quickly leads to overgrazing and results in loss of surface cover, enabling erosion, which is exacerbating desertification throughout the West Bank.

In addition to the effects of overgrazing, cattle are notorious for trampling and damaging or destroying stone terraces. These terraces have been referred to as the pyramids of Palestine due to the amount of labor that went into erecting them throughout the hill regions. Their role is central in preserving not just topsoil but moisture. In the region's semi-arid climate, up to 60% of rainwater is lost to evaporation. Terraces force water underground and trap essential moisture. Studies on the impact of terraces on olive culture have shown that trees with erected terraces protecting them produce 10%–15% more oil. Decreasing soil moisture, increasing temperatures, and enclosures preventing goats from grazing combine to create the ticking timebombs of wildfires. The water retention enabled by terraces recharges groundwater aquifers and/or creates springs, depending on the geography of the area. The long-term impact of cattle could be to decrease access to water for everyone who relies on it.1

Where settler cowboys and their cattle are the main force of ecological invasion, wild boars are the shock troops. Virtually nonexistent in the mountains of the West Bank prior to the 1980s, wild boar has populated the hills and increased their numbers as a result of Israeli Civil Affairs (ICA) conservation policies that have made it illegal for Palestinians to shoot them. While human rights organizations have yet to document it, dozens of citizen reports across the last two decades claim settlers intentionally release wild boar into Palestinians agricultural areas. The largest casualty of boar advances is triticulture or wheat production in the West Bank hills, which has almost completely disappeared where they roam (see Amira, 2021). Over the last few decades, boars have been able to benefit from interrelated processes: ICA-designated conservation parks where these boars populate; pine trees planted by the Jewish National Fund, which are ideal congregation points for wild boars; and ICA culling bans and settler attacks on agricultural communities. In the summer heat, boars driven by thirst enter population areas and target water tanks and irrigation drips, and they have been known to dig under fencing or bring down rock walls to get to a water source. They continue to damage green houses, gardens, fields, and groves and have injured and killed people who fall along their path.

As noted above, Area C makes up 60% of the West Bank and contains most of its agricultural land and natural resources. It is subject to Israeli security and administrative control, yet services and essential infrastructure are financed largely by either intergovernmental organizations, donor states, or the PA and are implemented by NGOs and local government units. The ability of civil organizations to function has decreased exponentially in the last decade (and most acutely since 2018). A central reason for this is impediments created by settler organizations.

Ragavim and NGO Monitor are two settler organizations that have worked to speed the pace of colonial eliminatory rhythms (Ghantous & Joronen, 2022). NGO Monitor started harassing donors of organizations operating in Area C in 2018 with a campaign to cut the funding of Maan Development Center, which was temporarily successful. Ragavim meanwhile targeted the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC) from as early as 2014, and in 2018 affirmed targeting “the main organisation involved in agricultural projects in Area C” (White, 2020). That this targeting reached five other rights organizations whose work focused on challenging the settler state should come as no surprise. Unfortunately, this second wave was more successful and several of these organizations have not been able to regain their prior strength (and funding). Among much other work, Maan and UAWC operate mainly in Area C. Maan is one of Palestine's oldest environmental organizations and has worked tirelessly for decades to ban carcinogenic pesticides. The UAWC is the only organization that preserves indigenous seeds (i.e., Baladi seeds) in its seed bank.

The attacks on these essential organizations were a rehearsal for what has happened since October 7. Claims of ties to terrorism get lobbed, and donors withdraw their funds when interventions are most needed. The European Union's rash recent decision to freeze aid funding to the West Bank demonstrates the chilling success of these tactics. Yet the evidence provided is all the more worrying, especially considering how willing most European donor states are to give legibility to Israeli claims when torture of prisoners and extraction of false confessions by the Israeli government is well documented (Addameer, n.d.; OHCHR, 2021).

The freezing of UNRWA funding when mass starvation is at Gaza's doors is arguably as criminal as the siege itself. Yet there seems to have been a sleight of hand in the funding landscape as well. Many projects canceled during the funding freeze were not reinstated but rather the money was diverted to humanitarian response, leaving vulnerable communities in Area C at the mercy of settler cowboys. UN-OCHA, the Colonization and Wall Resistance Committee (CWRC), and B'tselem seem to be actively documenting the situation. Yet they are not structured any different from UNRWA, the PA, and Palestinian NGOs, and hence are prone to being targeted by settler organizations—and indeed often are.

The throttling of work and income has also been leveraged against Palestinians. West Bank Palestinian laborers who work inside the Green Line had their permits suspended after October 7, leading to a jump from 14% to 30% unemployment. This increase is due to 150,000–180,000 Palestinians working in settlements and Israeli cities, roughly 75% of whom have not been permitted to return to work since (Bajec, 2024). Since October 7, the Israeli government has started deducting tax revenue collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority, and public sector employees are receiving as low as 50% of their wages some months. Public sector employees number roughly 165,000–185,000 people, with the West Bank constituting roughly 140,000 of them. In addition to the above, the increase in checkpoints is increasing the cost of transport within the West Bank, raising food costs. Finally, tourism constitutes an important source of income in some cities, especially Bethlehem, Jerusalem, and Jericho, an industry that has all but ceased to operate since October 7.

The largest employers in the West Bank are the PA, employment in Israeli construction and agriculture sectors, and civil society organizations. That all three sources are subject to cuts shows the high level of dependency created by the Oslo Accords and the real-life impact of collective punishment. In short, the squeeze put on Palestinian society in the West Bank since October 7 has aimed at punishing the middle and working classes, targeting their access to food and water, their livelihoods, and their ways of life. How much longer the pressure can hold without an ensuing explosion is not clear. What is clear is that a lot of people have less income at a time when the price of food is rising and that the dynamics of culture, politics, labor, food, and the environment are inextricably linked.

To conclude, it is important to note the discourse of blame and responsibility that is starting to circulate. This pertains particularly to the scapegoating of Netanyahu's premiership and right-wing governing coalitions. While certainly there are some unique characteristics to the current government, the fundamental fact is that the settler colonization of Palestine has continued regardless of who sits on what chair in the Knesset. The intention to replace the native population has been in the planning from the start. Now more than ever, Patrick Wolfe's maxim that “invasion is a structure not an event” holds true.

2023 年 10 月 7 日之后西岸的农业和粮食问题
自 2023 年 10 月 7 日以来西岸的农业状况是该日期之前持续不断的破坏、没收和圈地进程的延续。巴勒斯坦农业部(2024 年)估计,从 2023 年 10 月 7 日至 12 月 31 日,巴勒斯坦农牧民遭受的损失总额为 22,585,410 美元。西岸农民目前面临的许多问题只是他们几十年来一直忍受的持续暴力主题的细微变化,但更明显的变化是自 10 月 7 日以来的变化速度。数十个甚至数百个社区突然面临流离失所的危险,而在某些地方,流离失所者的人数已经达到数千人。在约旦河西岸,维持生计最多的农业形式是油料文化和畜牧业,这两种形式一直是以色列军队和定居者的主要目标。今天在约旦河西岸发生的事情无法与加沙的破坏规模相提并论,但这更能说明发生在加沙的恐怖。自 10 月 7 日以来,在约旦河西岸发生的定居者袭击、定居点扩张、军队入侵、冲突和暗杀青年的规模是 2000-2005 年第二次起义以来从未见过的。与此同时,土地、水和收入的迅速减少正在侵蚀着人们养活自己和家人的能力。作为一个地中海国家,巴勒斯坦由几个小区域组成。西岸西端海拔 200 米,有几处海拔超过 1000 米。山丘以东是约旦河谷,到杰里科市时海拔下降到 276 米以下。约旦河谷是约旦河西岸的菜篮子,这里的村庄和杰里科都有充足的灌溉农业,而贝都因人则居住在灌溉地和山丘之间的南北延伸地带。丘陵的西面和北面是沿海平原,包括盖勒吉利耶、图勒凯里姆和杰宁地区,这些地区的橄榄油产量占全国产量的 50%以上。丘陵以南是纳卡布沙漠的边缘地带,以希伯伦市及其众多人口密集的城镇为代表。作为 1994 年奥斯陆和平进程的一部分,西岸按照不同的控制线划分,A 区由巴勒斯坦行政和安全控制,B 区由巴勒斯坦行政和以色列安全控制,C 区由以色列行政和安全控制。这些安排原本只是暂时的,直到达成更全面的和平协议。然而,永久和平从未实现,临时安排成为 "现状"。A 区包括约旦河西岸的大部分城市,而占约旦河西岸约 60% 的 C 区则包括大部分农田和自然资源。2023 年的收成因最近的袭击而中断。由于橄榄的生产是两年一次,因此很难准确估计损失,但与 2022 年的 3.6 万吨和 2021 年的 1.7 万吨相比,2023 年的 1 万吨就显得微不足道了。联合国人道协调厅指出,2023 年的橄榄油产量损失约 1200 公吨,直接经济损失达 1000 万美元(联合国人道协调厅,2024 年)。此外,与前两年相比,今年约有 10%的橄榄榨油厂没有开业,原因是道路关闭,难以到达榨油厂。在 1948 年 Nakbeh(灾难)之前,巴勒斯坦有近 600 万棵橄榄树(Al-Taher,1947 年)。虽然约旦河西岸只占历史上巴勒斯坦面积的 22%,但今天这里却有大约 1 千万棵结满果实的橄榄树。在整个巴勒斯坦领土上,橄榄树占果树的 85%,占西岸和加沙地带可耕地的 54%。橄榄树为 8 万至 10 万个巴勒斯坦家庭的生计做出了贡献,占国内生产总值的 4.6%(世界银行,2018 年)。1967 年至今,橄榄树栽培面积扩大的主要原因是土地防御。1967 年西岸被占领后,军事当局以 "闲置 "为由没收土地。与大田作物相比,橄榄树几乎不需要照料,而且当地的许多栽培品种都具有抗旱和抗病能力,因此是土地保卫战的理想选择。它们既保证了人们的生计,又保护了土地,使油橄榄种植在不确定时期的扩展成为一种社会保护。 20 世纪 70 年代和 80 年代,在青年志愿者的推动下,种植了数百万棵橄榄树。国际援助在扩大橄榄种植方面也发挥了作用,1948-1967 年期间,英国政府资助的梯田农业和油橄榄种植得到了扩大,成为新难民创收的一种手段(Reger,2018 年)。自 1994 年巴勒斯坦权力机构(PA)成立以来,多项政府计划致力于通过油橄榄种植扩大土地保护,并辅之以旨在提高生产力和盈利能力的捐助方干预。鉴于橄榄产业在生产粮食、增加收入和保护土地方面的作用,难怪以色列军队和定居者会如此系统地将其作为目标。联合国人道主义事务协调厅估计,从 1967 年到 2011 年,超过 80 万棵橄榄树被连根拔起,而巴勒斯坦农业部和中央统计局的记录显示,从 2010 年到 2023 年,超过 27.8 万棵橄榄树被完全或部分摧毁。综合这些数字,并考虑到 2010-2011 年的重复计算,我们发现自西岸被占领以来,橄榄树的伤亡率超过了一百万棵。殖民化和抵抗隔离墙委员会的 2023 年度报告记录了 2023 年对约旦河西岸的 379 次袭击,在被摧毁的 21 731 棵树中,橄榄树仅占不到 19 000 棵,接近 90%。可以肯定的是,这些统计数字只是冰山一角。贝都因人社区居住在约旦河谷东部,牧民社区居住在希伯伦南部雅塔镇周围地区。贝都因人历来被误解为不务农的族群。然而,他们过去和现在都在从事放牧活动。很多时候,他们耕作的目的是为了养活自己的牲畜。约旦河谷的贝都因人和 Masafir Yatta 的牧民的家园和生计受到威胁已有一段时间了。2016 年,约旦河谷的贝都因人社区有 3000 个家庭,其中约 18 个不同的部落居住在 "E1 "山口,以色列当局不断试图将其人口驱逐出去。超过 40% 的贝都因社区被剥夺了电力基础设施,在用水方面,贝都因人每天只能获得 20 升水,而附近的定居者每天能获得 300 升水(联合国开发计划署,2017 年)。2016-2017 年期间,军队和定居者造成的破坏导致西岸 84% 的贝都因人和巴勒斯坦牧民需要援助,其中约 55% 的人粮食无保障。定居者暴力是这些地区的主要问题。10 月 7 日之前,西岸平均每天发生三起定居者袭击事件。自 10 月 7 日以来,这一数字已上升至平均每天 7 起袭击事件(联合国人道协调厅,2023 年)。2018 年后,以色列政府中右翼联盟的形成使社区的困难处境进一步升级。从那时起,"牧民殖民化"(al-istitan al-ra'awi [الاستيطان الرعو])一词进入了阿拉伯语词典。在约旦河谷,这些 "定居牛仔 "的工作主要围绕着围堵水源。封闭水源值得特别关注。在过去的 25-30 年里,由于气候变化以及定居点和 ABC 分区造成的地貌变化,许多泉水干涸了。在过去 5 年中,70%-80%的水泉被封闭,完全处于以色列的控制之下。其余的水泉也在以色列的控制之下,但允许牧民在某些时候部分进入。在约旦河谷,自 10 月 7 日以来,至少有 16 个贝都因人社区完全流离失所,缺水是一个主要原因。在政府或非政府组织的援助和/或临时购买饲料可以抵消牧场被圈占的情况下,水需求的数量和规模使其成本更高,需要更频繁地进行干预。以水罐车和筒仓为目标只会使问题更加严重。约旦河谷干旱炎热,夏季平均气温为 36°C,气候变化引发的热浪将在 2023 年使气温高达 46°C。随着夏季高温的来临,那些无法保证牲畜用水的牧民将被迫出售或搬迁。自 10 月 7 日以来,定居者牛仔已转而直接针对和破坏农业机械、灌溉管道和水箱,以及伤害、没收或释放该地区社区成员的畜群,他们经常威胁甚至枪杀社区成员。 定居者曾经协助军队执行这些任务,但自 10 月 7 日以来,定居者似乎穿上了他们的后备役军装,直接实施这些袭击。据报告,牛仔-民兵袭击在 Masafir Yatta 地区更为频繁,那里的巴勒斯坦私人土地正在被公开没收和圈占。巴勒斯坦人的放牧范围被限制在距离社区中心 100 米的半径范围内,而供水基础设施和水罐车继续遭到破坏和损毁。定居者牧羊人在巴勒斯坦农民种植小麦和大麦的土地上放牧。定居者在马萨菲尔的山顶上搭建帐篷和大篷车,并用公路将这些大篷车连接起来,从而切断和隔离了巴勒斯坦小社区。熟悉阿尔弗雷德-克罗斯比(Alfred Crosby)(2004 年)关于生态帝国主义的著作的人不会对发现定居者在西岸景观塑造中的类似策略感到震惊。定居者牛仔在马萨菲尔半沙漠边缘地区放牧,而在约旦河西岸的其他地区则主要放牧牛群。这些名副其实的定居者牛仔放牧时使用的武器是 Ozi 和 AR15,而不是老式西部片中常见的亨利连发步枪或温彻斯特步枪。牛群被允许把巴勒斯坦的粮田、橄榄树林和梯田当作露天牧场,随地毁坏树木和庄稼。与绵羊群和山羊群不同,在这种地形下放牧大群的牛很快就会导致过度放牧,造成地表植被流失,导致水土流失,加剧了整个约旦河西岸的荒漠化。这些梯田被称为巴勒斯坦的金字塔,因为在整个丘陵地区修建这些梯田耗费了大量的人力物力。梯田的作用不仅在于保持表土,还在于保持水分。在该地区的半干旱气候中,多达 60% 的雨水会因蒸发而流失。梯田将水引入地下,截留了必要的水分。有关梯田对橄榄树栽培影响的研究表明,有梯田保护的橄榄树产油量要高出 10%-15%。土壤水分减少、气温升高、围栏阻止山羊吃草,这些因素结合在一起,形成了野火的定时炸弹。梯田的蓄水功能可补充地下蓄水层和/或创造泉水,这取决于该地区的地理条件。1 在定居的牛仔和他们的牛是生态入侵的主力军的地方,野猪则是冲击部队。20 世纪 80 年代以前,西岸山区几乎不存在野猪,但由于以色列民政部门(ICA)的保护政策,巴勒斯坦人射杀野猪是非法的,因此野猪在山区繁衍生息,数量也有所增加。虽然人权组织尚未对此进行记录,但在过去二十年中,有几十份公民报告称,定居者故意将野猪放生到巴勒斯坦人的农业区。野猪进犯造成的最大损失是约旦河西岸丘陵地区的三元种植或小麦生产,在野猪出没的地方,小麦生产几乎完全消失(见《阿米拉》,2021 年)。在过去的几十年里,野猪已经从相互关联的进程中受益:国际野猪保护协会指定的保护公园是野猪的栖息地;犹太民族基金种植的松树是野猪的理想聚集点;国际野猪保护协会的捕杀禁令和定居者对农业社区的攻击。在炎热的夏季,野猪在饥渴的驱使下进入居民区,以水箱和灌溉滴水为目标。如上所述,C 区占西岸面积的 60%,包含了西岸的大部分农田和自然资源。它受到以色列的安全和行政控制,但服务和基本基础设施主要由政府间组织、捐助国或巴权力机构提供资金,由非政府组织和地方政府部门负责实施。在过去十年中(2018 年以来最为严重),民间组织的运作能力急剧下降。其核心原因是定居者组织制造的障碍。Ragavim 和非政府组织监测组织是两个定居者组织,它们致力于加快殖民消除节奏的步伐(Ghantous &amp; Joronen, 2022)。非政府组织监测组织从 2018 年开始骚扰在 C 区开展活动的组织的捐助者,发起了一场削减马安发展中心资金的运动,并取得了暂时的成功。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Culture Agriculture Food and Environment
Culture Agriculture Food and Environment AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS & POLICY-
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