The Impossibility of Subjectless Experience

IF 1.6 4区 心理学 0 PHILOSOPHY
G. Strawson
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Abstract

All experience is experiencing, and therefore entails an experiencer — i.e.a subject of experience. This is an a priori truth. It does not entail that, in the case of any given episode of experience, the portion of reality that is correctly said to be the experiencer (the subject of the experience) is something ontically distinct from the portion of reality that is the episode of experience itself, and there is one metaphysically fundamental way of conceiving of the subject of experience — the thin conception — given which the subject of an experience is not ontically distinct from the experience.
无主体体验的不可能性
所有的经验都是体验,因此必然有一个体验者,即体验的主体。这是一个先验真理。但这并不意味着,在任何特定的经验事件中,被正确地说成是经验者(经验的主体)的那部分现实与作为经验事件本身的那部分现实在本体论上是不同的,有一种形而上学的基本方式--薄概念--来设想经验的主体,在这种方式下,经验的主体在本体论上与经验并不不同。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
14.30%
发文量
58
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