Awais Yousaf , Ahmed Amro , Philip Teow Huat Kwa , Meixuan Li , Jianying Zhou
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
The increasing interest in autonomous ships within the maritime industry is driven by the pursuit of revenue optimization, operational efficiency, safety improvement and going greener. However, the industry’s increasing reliance on emerging technologies for the development of autonomous ships extends the attack surface, leaving the underlying ship systems vulnerable to potential exploitation by malicious actors. In response to these emerging challenges, this research extends an existing cyber risk assessment approach called FMECA-ATT&CK based on failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA), and the MITRE ATT&CK framework. As a part of our work, we have expanded the FMECA-ATT&CK approach to assessing cyber risks related to systems with artificial intelligence components in cyber-enabled autonomous ships (e.g. autonomous engine monitoring and control). This new capability was developed using the information and semantics encoded in the MITRE ATLAS framework. FMECA-ATT&CK has been adopted due to its comprehensive and adaptable nature and its promising venue for supporting continuous cyber risk assessment. It helps evaluate the cyber risks associated with the complex and state-of-the-art operational technologies on board autonomous ships. The cyber risk assessment approach assists cybersecurity experts in aligning mitigation strategies for the cyber defence of autonomous ships. It also contributes towards advancing overall cybersecurity in the maritime industry and ensures the safe and secure sailing of autonomous ships. Our key findings after applying the proposed approach against a model of an autonomous cargo ship is the identification of the Navigation Situation Awareness System (NSAS) of the ship as being at the highest risk followed by the Autonomous Engine Monitoring and Control (AEMC) system. Additionally, we identified 3 high, 48 medium, and 5776 low risks across 29 components.
期刊介绍:
The International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection (IJCIP) was launched in 2008, with the primary aim of publishing scholarly papers of the highest quality in all areas of critical infrastructure protection. Of particular interest are articles that weave science, technology, law and policy to craft sophisticated yet practical solutions for securing assets in the various critical infrastructure sectors. These critical infrastructure sectors include: information technology, telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation systems, chemicals, critical manufacturing, agriculture and food, defense industrial base, public health and health care, national monuments and icons, drinking water and water treatment systems, commercial facilities, dams, emergency services, nuclear reactors, materials and waste, postal and shipping, and government facilities. Protecting and ensuring the continuity of operation of critical infrastructure assets are vital to national security, public health and safety, economic vitality, and societal wellbeing.
The scope of the journal includes, but is not limited to:
1. Analysis of security challenges that are unique or common to the various infrastructure sectors.
2. Identification of core security principles and techniques that can be applied to critical infrastructure protection.
3. Elucidation of the dependencies and interdependencies existing between infrastructure sectors and techniques for mitigating the devastating effects of cascading failures.
4. Creation of sophisticated, yet practical, solutions, for critical infrastructure protection that involve mathematical, scientific and engineering techniques, economic and social science methods, and/or legal and public policy constructs.