“Tis new to thee’: response to Gruenewald, Knijp, Schoenmaker, and van Tilburg

IF 2 Q1 LAW
Dimitri Demekas, Pierpaolo Grippa
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

In ‘Embracing the Brave New World: A Response to Demekas and Grippa’, a response to our article ‘Walking a Tightrope: Financial Regulation, Climate Change, and the Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy’, both published in the Journal of Financial Regulation, Gruenewald, Knijp, Schoenmaker, and van Tilburg claim that climate risk is a clear and present danger to financial stability that justifies imposing higher capital requirements on supervised firms. Until the current prudential risk framework is revised to fully capture climate risk, they advocate ad hoc measures, such as adjustments to risk weights, which, they believe, would have the desired effect. In this article, we argue that these claims are misguided. Given the nature of climate risk, risk assessment models cannot provide a reliable basis for calibrating capital requirements. On the basis of the evidence, prudential tools would have only a negligible impact on the transition. And the idea of adjusting risk weights for climate exposures has been abandoned—for good reasons. Ultimately, there is nothing financial regulation can do about the energy transition that an appropriately designed carbon tax cannot do better. Central banks and financial regulators should resist the pressure to take on additional responsibilities that are essentially political and that they cannot properly discharge.
"对你来说是新的':对 Gruenewald、Knijp、Schoenmaker 和 van Tilburg 的回应
在《拥抱勇敢的新世界:对 Demekas 和 Grippa 的回应》是对我们的文章《走钢丝:中,Gruenewald、Knijp、Schoenmaker 和 van Tilburg 声称,气候风险对金融稳定构成了明确而现实的危险,因此有理由对受监管公司提出更高的资本要求。在修订现行审慎风险框架以充分反映气候风险之前,他们主张采取临时措施,如调整风险权重,他们认为这样做可以达到预期效果。在本文中,我们认为这些主张是错误的。鉴于气候风险的性质,风险评估模型无法为校准资本要求提供可靠的依据。根据证据,审慎工具对过渡的影响微乎其微。针对气候风险调整风险权重的想法已被放弃--这是有充分理由的。归根结底,对于能源转型,金融监管所能做的,只有设计合理的碳税才能做得更好。中央银行和金融监管机构应抵制压力,不承担本质上是政治性的、他们无法适当履行的额外责任。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.60
自引率
3.80%
发文量
12
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