Do promoters cause financial distress in a bank?

Shailesh Rastogi, Jagjeevan Kanoujiya
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Abstract

Purpose The study aims to explore the impact of ownership concentration (OC) on bank financial distress (FD). Furthermore, the bank’s financial stability levels determine the association between the two. Design/methodology/approach Bank data of 33 Indian commercial banks are procured for ten years (2013–2022). The panel data econometrics is applied for empirical estimations. The quantile regression approach is used to determine the association between OC and FD at different quantiles of the FD. Non-normalcy of the data is checked and ensured before applying the quantile regression. Findings Surprisingly, it is found that promoters have a nonlinear impact on the firm’s stability. The inverted U-shape result implies that as promoters cross a threshold level, the benefit of increasing promoters’ stake takes a beating and a further increase in promoters’ stakes adversely impacts the stability of the banks. Moreover, this threshold value increases while moving from low to high levels of stability in a quantile regression application. Research limitations/implications This study uses promoters as the proxy for OC. Other existing definitions of OC are not used in the study, which can further improve the robustness of the results. Additionally, the use of the type of ownership (private, public or foreign) is also not adopted in the present study. Both the limitations can be the study’s future scope on the topic. Practical implications The high OC is supposed to influence corporate governance adversely. Therefore, policymakers recommend low OC for better governance. However, the present study finds evidence that a higher OC (high threshold of OC as the stability increases) would be better for financial stability. This situation demands a trade-off between governance and financial stability regarding OC. Originality/value The authors do not observe any study having the nonlinear impact of OC on financial stability (opposite of FD). Moreover, the threshold of OC for the optimum level of financial stability increases as stability goes high. This evidence using quantile regression and finding the turning point using a quadratic equation is also not seen in the literature.
发起人是否会导致银行陷入财务困境?
目的 本研究旨在探讨所有权集中度(OC)对银行财务困境(FD)的影响。此外,银行的财务稳定性水平决定了两者之间的关联。采用面板数据计量经济学进行实证估计。使用量子回归方法来确定在不同量级的 FD 下 OC 与 FD 之间的关联。在应用量化回归之前,对数据的非正态性进行了检查并确保数据的非正态性。倒 U 型结果表明,当发起人越过一个临界值时,增加发起人股份的好处就会受到打击,发起人股份的进一步增加会对银行的稳定性产生不利影响。此外,在量子回归应用中,当稳定性从低水平上升到高水平时,这一临界值也会随之上升。研究中没有使用其他现有的 OC 定义,这可以进一步提高研究结果的稳健性。此外,本研究也没有采用所有权类型(私有、公有或外资)。这两个局限性都可能成为本研究课题的未来研究范围。因此,政策制定者建议采用较低的公司法人治理结构来改善公司治理。然而,本研究发现,有证据表明,较高的 OC(随着稳定性的提高,OC 临界值越高)更有利于金融稳定。这种情况要求在治理和金融稳定性之间权衡 OC。原创性/价值作者没有发现任何研究表明 OC 对金融稳定性有非线性影响(与 FD 相反)。此外,金融稳定性最佳水平的 OC 门槛随着稳定性的提高而提高。这种使用量化回归和二次方程寻找转折点的证据在文献中也未曾出现过。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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