Firm decisions and government subsidies in a supply chain with consumer surplus consideration

Yongbo Xiao, Xiuyi Zhang, Xiaole Wu
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Abstract

This paper considers a supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer, who concern their respective profits as well as consumer welfare. Each firm's objective is modelled as a weighted sum of its profit and consumer surplus, with the weight on consumer surplus representing the concern level of the firm. We first examine a push supply chain where the manufacturer determines the wholesale price and the retailer determines the order quantity. We derive the optimal decisions and investigate the impact of the firms' consumer surplus consideration on the interactive decisions of the supply chain members and the overall performance of the supply chain. We show that a higher level of retailer's consumer concern does not necessarily lead to higher consumer surplus because her concern on consumers may be exploited by the manufacturer to improve his objective; and the manufacturer's concern on consumers may not benefit the retailer in terms of her profit, especially when the manufacturer's concern level is relatively low. Nevertheless, compared to the for‐profit supply chain, concern on consumer surplus could be beneficial to both firms' profits as well as consumer surplus, inducing a “win‐win‐win” situation under certain conditions. Furthermore, as a social planner, the government seeks to optimize social welfare by adopting subsidy policies, and we examine two types of intervention policies, that is, subsidizing firms and subsidizing consumers. We show that when subsidizing firms, government's quantity‐based subsidy is always more cost‐effective than sales‐based subsidy. As the firms' concern levels become higher or the demand uncertainty becomes lower, subsidizing consumers can achieve higher social welfare than subsidizing firms. Moreover, we examine the impact of the government's budget constraint and concern level on consumer surplus, and extend the analysis to a pull supply chain to show the robustness of the major findings.
考虑消费者剩余的供应链中的企业决策和政府补贴
本文考虑的供应链由制造商和零售商组成,他们关注各自的利润和消费者福利。每家公司的目标都是其利润和消费者剩余的加权和,消费者剩余的权重代表公司的关注程度。我们首先研究了一个由制造商决定批发价、零售商决定订货量的推式供应链。我们推导出最优决策,并研究了企业对消费者剩余的考虑对供应链成员互动决策和供应链整体绩效的影响。我们的研究表明,零售商对消费者的关注程度越高,并不一定会带来更高的消费者剩余,因为制造商可能会利用零售商对消费者的关注来提高自己的目标;而制造商对消费者的关注未必会给零售商带来利润上的好处,尤其是当制造商的关注程度相对较低时。然而,与营利性供应链相比,对消费者剩余的关注既有利于企业的利润,也有利于消费者剩余,在一定条件下会产生 "三赢 "局面。此外,作为社会规划者,政府通过采取补贴政策来实现社会福利的最优化,我们研究了两类干预政策,即补贴企业和补贴消费者。我们的研究表明,在补贴企业时,政府基于数量的补贴总是比基于销售额的补贴更具成本效益。随着企业关注度的提高或需求不确定性的降低,补贴消费者比补贴企业能获得更高的社会福利。此外,我们还考察了政府预算约束和关注水平对消费者剩余的影响,并将分析扩展到拉动式供应链,以显示主要结论的稳健性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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