Gasoline and electric vehicle ownership rationing over time: Lottery vs. First-come-first-served schemes

IF 5.8 1区 工程技术 Q1 ECONOMICS
Wen-Jing Liu , Zhi-Chun Li , Hai Yang
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper addresses the ownership rationing issues of gasoline vehicles (GV) and electric vehicles (EV) in a given time horizon. A state-owned vehicle manufacturer is assumed to be the producer of these vehicles. Two typical rationing schemes for the GV and EV ownership that have been implemented in some Chinese megacities, namely a simultaneous lottery scheme for both GV and EV and a hybrid scheme consisting of lottery for GV and first-come-first-served (FCFS) for EV, are investigated. Multi-period social cost minimization models are proposed for determining the optimal auto quota (i.e., the number of vehicles to be produced) and the optimal frequency of ownership allocation for each scheme in the given time horizon. In the proposed models, residents’ heterogeneity is considered in terms of their values of time (VOTs). The properties of the proposed models are analytically explored, and a comparison between the lottery mode and the FCFS mode is made. The results show that the lottery mode outperforms the FCFS mode in terms of the total social cost. The VOT threshold of the subsequent participants in auto rationing schemes tends to be higher than that of the preceding participants. The decision of EV subsidy should be cautiously made due to a tug of war between the resultant decreased pollutant emissions and increased traffic congestion. The implementation of the auto ownership rationing schemes can cause inequity issue in terms of the changes of travel costs of different-income residents. A Pareto-improvement strategy is presented to balance equity and efficiency of the rationing schemes.

汽油车和电动车所有权配给随时间变化:彩票与先到先得计划
本文探讨了在给定时间范围内汽油车(GV)和电动车(EV)的所有权配给问题。假设国有汽车制造商是这些车辆的生产商。研究了在中国一些大城市实施的两种典型的汽油车和电动车所有权配给方案,即汽油车和电动车同时抽签方案,以及汽油车抽签和电动车先到先得(FCFS)混合方案。本文提出了多期社会成本最小化模型,用于确定每种方案在给定时间跨度内的最佳汽车配额(即生产的汽车数量)和最佳所有权分配频率。在所提出的模型中,居民的异质性按其时间价值(VOT)来考虑。对所提模型的特性进行了分析探讨,并对抽签模式和 FCFS 模式进行了比较。结果表明,就社会总成本而言,抽签模式优于 FCFS 模式。在自动配给计划中,后续参与者的 VOT 临界值往往高于前面的参与者。由于电动汽车补贴会导致污染物排放减少和交通拥堵加剧,因此应谨慎决策。汽车保有量配给制的实施会造成不同收入居民出行成本变化的不公平问题。本文提出了一种帕累托改进策略,以平衡配给方案的公平与效率。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Transportation Research Part B-Methodological
Transportation Research Part B-Methodological 工程技术-工程:土木
CiteScore
12.40
自引率
8.80%
发文量
143
审稿时长
14.1 weeks
期刊介绍: Transportation Research: Part B publishes papers on all methodological aspects of the subject, particularly those that require mathematical analysis. The general theme of the journal is the development and solution of problems that are adequately motivated to deal with important aspects of the design and/or analysis of transportation systems. Areas covered include: traffic flow; design and analysis of transportation networks; control and scheduling; optimization; queuing theory; logistics; supply chains; development and application of statistical, econometric and mathematical models to address transportation problems; cost models; pricing and/or investment; traveler or shipper behavior; cost-benefit methodologies.
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