Hegel and the Hatäta Zär'a Ya‛ǝqob: Africa in the Philosophy of History and the History of Philosophy

Hegel Bulletin Pub Date : 2024-06-03 DOI:10.1017/hgl.2024.33
Jonathan Egid
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Abstract

This article explores an episode in the reception of Hegel's philosophy of history and historiography of philosophy with reference to the question of the possibility of non-Western philosophy, in particular African philosophy. Section I briefly outlines the contents of the Hatäta Zär'a Ya‛ǝqob and the controversy over its authorship, focusing in particular on the argument of the Ethiopianist and scholar of Semitic languages Carlo Conti Rossini that ‘rationalistic’ philosophy was impossible in Ethiopia. In section II I suggest that a major component of the intellectual background to this notion of the impossibility of philosophy in Africa can be traced to Hegel's philosophy of history. To substantiate this claim I begin by providing an account of the broader historiographical shift between 1780 and 1830, in which Africa and Asia came to be excluded from the history of philosophy, and I suggest that Hegel's philosophy of history was decisive in this process. I examine how Hegel's account of history as the realization and actualization of freedom goes together with the development of cultural production culminating in philosophy, and how both of these processes (if they are really separate processes at all), can be mapped onto particular historical-geographical populations and cultures. I suggest that, even though this was not Hegel's intention, by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries this served as a cultural justification for political domination: those who are unfree are unfree because they are unthinking (unphilosophical), and those who are unthinking cannot be free. Finally in section III I connect this Hegelian conception to Conti Rossini's work, both his article on the Hatäta and as apologist for Italian imperialism. I conclude by reflecting on what this underexplored connection between Hegel and early twentieth-century theorists of culture might mean for attempts to construct global histories of philosophy.
黑格尔与 Hatäta Zär'a Ya‛edqob:历史哲学和哲学史中的非洲
本文从非西方哲学,尤其是非洲哲学的可能性问题出发,探讨了黑格尔历史哲学和哲学史学接受过程中的一个插曲。第一部分简要概述了《Hatäta Zär'a Ya‛ǝqob》的内容以及关于其作者的争议,尤其侧重于埃塞俄比亚学者和闪米特语言学者 Carlo Conti Rossini 的论点,即 "理性主义 "哲学在埃塞俄比亚是不可能的。在第二部分中,我认为非洲不可能有哲学这一观点的主要思想背景可以追溯到黑格尔的历史哲学。为了证实这一说法,我首先介绍了 1780 年至 1830 年间更广泛的历史学转变,在这一转变中,非洲和亚洲被排除在哲学史之外,我认为黑格尔的历史哲学在这一过程中起了决定性作用。我研究了黑格尔关于历史是自由的实现和现实化的论述是如何与以哲学为顶点的文化生产的发展相结合的,以及这两个过程(如果它们真的是独立的过程的话)是如何映射到特定的历史地理人群和文化上的。我认为,尽管这并非黑格尔的本意,但在十九世纪末二十世纪初,这已成为政治统治的文化理由:不自由的人之所以不自由,是因为他们不思考(不哲学),而不思考的人不可能自由。最后,在第三部分中,我将黑格尔的这一概念与孔蒂-罗西尼的作品联系起来,包括他关于哈塔的文章和作为意大利帝国主义辩护人的作品。最后,我将反思黑格尔与二十世纪早期文化理论家之间这种未被充分发掘的联系对于构建全球哲学史的尝试意味着什么。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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