{"title":"The Rule of Law: A Slogan in Search of a Concept","authors":"Martin Loughlin","doi":"10.1007/s40803-024-00224-5","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Regularly invoked but rarely defined, ‘the rule of law’ has over the last few decades been converted from a legal term of art into one of the most ambiguous slogans of contemporary public policy. Political scientists claim it as a crucial test of a regime’s legitimacy. Economists maintain that it provides an essential foundation of a flourishing market economy. Philosophers suggest it captures the essence of the state as a moral association. Historians acknowledge that, even if they might distrust such an abstract notion, the imposition of effective inhibitions on power is an ‘unqualified human good’. And lawyers, of course, have treated it as the foundation of their discipline ever since the mid-thirteenth century when Bracton asserted that ‘there is no rex where will rules rather than lex’. Those who extend its usage beyond the confines of professional legal discourse commonly give it a positive valence. But the rule of law also has its detractors. These critics assert that it promotes purely formal, individualistic values at the expense of substantive justice, or that it is a smokescreen preventing us from seeing the impact of recent global developments that signal the rule of lawyers. Some anthropologists even denounce it as an imperial ideology that legitimates European conquest and the plunder of the rest of the world. But given the fact that almost every state in the world now claims to act in compliance with the rule of law, these critics seem to have done little to dent its appeal. Yet, the sheer range of views and perspectives that now exist about the meaning, purpose, and value of the rule of law considerably complicates any inquiry into its current standing. In this paper, I will try to bring some clarity to the issue by providing a sketch of the main varieties of ways in which the term is being invoked. The paper comprises five sections, which each address a specific aspect of the term’s usage: (1) its coinage in English law, (2) the adoption of a superficially similar terminology in the German concept of the <i>Rechtsstaat</i>, (3) the jurisprudential innovations that complicate its meaning, and finally its most recent invocation (4) first in development work and (5) secondly in constitutional rejuvenation.</p>","PeriodicalId":45733,"journal":{"name":"Hague Journal on the Rule of Law","volume":"71 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Hague Journal on the Rule of Law","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-024-00224-5","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Regularly invoked but rarely defined, ‘the rule of law’ has over the last few decades been converted from a legal term of art into one of the most ambiguous slogans of contemporary public policy. Political scientists claim it as a crucial test of a regime’s legitimacy. Economists maintain that it provides an essential foundation of a flourishing market economy. Philosophers suggest it captures the essence of the state as a moral association. Historians acknowledge that, even if they might distrust such an abstract notion, the imposition of effective inhibitions on power is an ‘unqualified human good’. And lawyers, of course, have treated it as the foundation of their discipline ever since the mid-thirteenth century when Bracton asserted that ‘there is no rex where will rules rather than lex’. Those who extend its usage beyond the confines of professional legal discourse commonly give it a positive valence. But the rule of law also has its detractors. These critics assert that it promotes purely formal, individualistic values at the expense of substantive justice, or that it is a smokescreen preventing us from seeing the impact of recent global developments that signal the rule of lawyers. Some anthropologists even denounce it as an imperial ideology that legitimates European conquest and the plunder of the rest of the world. But given the fact that almost every state in the world now claims to act in compliance with the rule of law, these critics seem to have done little to dent its appeal. Yet, the sheer range of views and perspectives that now exist about the meaning, purpose, and value of the rule of law considerably complicates any inquiry into its current standing. In this paper, I will try to bring some clarity to the issue by providing a sketch of the main varieties of ways in which the term is being invoked. The paper comprises five sections, which each address a specific aspect of the term’s usage: (1) its coinage in English law, (2) the adoption of a superficially similar terminology in the German concept of the Rechtsstaat, (3) the jurisprudential innovations that complicate its meaning, and finally its most recent invocation (4) first in development work and (5) secondly in constitutional rejuvenation.
期刊介绍:
The Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (HJRL) is a multidisciplinary journal that aims to deepen and broaden our knowledge and understanding about the rule of law. Its main areas of interest are: current developments in rule of law in domestic, transnational and international contextstheoretical issues related to the conceptualization and implementation of the rule of law in domestic and international contexts;the relation between the rule of law and economic development, democratization and human rights protection;historical analysis of rule of law;significant trends and initiatives in rule of law promotion (practitioner notes).The HJRL is supported by HiiL Innovating Justice, The Hague, the Netherlands and the Paul Scholten Center for Jurisprudence at the Law School of the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.Editorial PolicyThe HJRL welcomes contributions from academics and practitioners with expertise in any relevant field, including law, anthropology, economics, history, philosophy, political science and sociology. It publishes two categories of articles: papers (appr. 6,000-10,000 words) and notes (appr. 2500 words). Papers are accepted on the basis of double blind peer-review. Notes are accepted on the basis of review by two or more editors of the journal. Manuscripts submitted to the HJRL must not be under consideration for publication elsewhere. Acceptance of the Editorial Board’s offer to publish, implies that the author agrees to an embargo on publication elsewhere for a period of two years following the date of publication in the HJRL.