{"title":"The New Mechanistic Approach and Cognitive Ontology—Or: What Role do (Neural) Mechanisms Play in Cognitive Ontology?","authors":"Beate Krickel","doi":"10.1007/s11023-024-09679-9","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Cognitive ontology has become a popular topic in philosophy, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. At its center is the question of which cognitive capacities should be included in the ontology of cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. One common strategy for answering this question is to look at brain structures and determine the cognitive capacities for which they are responsible. Some authors interpret this strategy as a search for <i>neural mechanisms</i>, as understood by the so-called <i>new mechanistic approach</i>. In this article, I will show that this <i>new mechanistic answer</i> is confronted with what I call the <i>triviality problem</i>. A discussion of this problem will show that one cannot derive a meaningful cognitive ontology from neural mechanisms alone. Nonetheless, neural mechanisms play a crucial role in the discovery of a cognitive ontology because they are <i>epistemic proxies for best systematizations</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":51133,"journal":{"name":"Minds and Machines","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Minds and Machines","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-024-09679-9","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Cognitive ontology has become a popular topic in philosophy, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. At its center is the question of which cognitive capacities should be included in the ontology of cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. One common strategy for answering this question is to look at brain structures and determine the cognitive capacities for which they are responsible. Some authors interpret this strategy as a search for neural mechanisms, as understood by the so-called new mechanistic approach. In this article, I will show that this new mechanistic answer is confronted with what I call the triviality problem. A discussion of this problem will show that one cannot derive a meaningful cognitive ontology from neural mechanisms alone. Nonetheless, neural mechanisms play a crucial role in the discovery of a cognitive ontology because they are epistemic proxies for best systematizations.
期刊介绍：
Minds and Machines, affiliated with the Society for Machines and Mentality, serves as a platform for fostering critical dialogue between the AI and philosophical communities. With a focus on problems of shared interest, the journal actively encourages discussions on the philosophical aspects of computer science.
Offering a global forum, Minds and Machines provides a space to debate and explore important and contentious issues within its editorial focus. The journal presents special editions dedicated to specific topics, invites critical responses to previously published works, and features review essays addressing current problem scenarios.
By facilitating a diverse range of perspectives, Minds and Machines encourages a reevaluation of the status quo and the development of new insights. Through this collaborative approach, the journal aims to bridge the gap between AI and philosophy, fostering a tradition of critique and ensuring these fields remain connected and relevant.
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