Family firms in government lobbies

Abstract

Purpose

Although the outcomes arising from firms’ interaction with policymakers is a developed theme, family firms’ political credentials and lobbying remain unexplored. To ignite this discourse, the extent to which these factors influence family firms’ tax experience and perception of corruption obstacles is estimated, as well as the impact on sales performance.

Design/methodology/approach

Cross-sectional data from Turkish family firms are examined by a structural equation model. The sample is comprised of 588 family firms spanning 12 regions.

Findings

The paths revealed that family firms’ political credentials do not inherently yield a positive tax experience. Rather, membership of a business association provides a medium to engage in lobbying activity. In turn, this leads to a more positive tax experience but also a greater exposure to corruption. Likewise, informed lobbying increases sales performance while corruption has the reverse effect.

Originality/value

The significant influences of political credentials and lobbying make a novel contribution to organisational field theory. Practically, the study appeals to family firms seeking to ease their tax experience while increasing sales and bypassing corruption.