{"title":"A jamming power control game with unknown user’s communication metric","authors":"A. Garnaev, W. Trappe","doi":"10.4108/ew.5991","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We consider a jamming problem in which a jammer aims to degrade a user’s communication in which the user might differ in applied applications or communication purposes. Such differences are reflected by different communication metrics used by the user. Specifically, signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) is used as a metric to reflect regular data transmission purposes. Meanwhile, as another metric, latency, modeled by the inverse SINR, is used to reflect emergency communication purposes. We consider the most difficult scenario for the jammer where it does not know which application (metric) the user employs. The problem is formulated as a Bayesian game. Equilibrium is found in closed form, and the dependence of equilibrium on network parameters is illustrated.","PeriodicalId":502230,"journal":{"name":"EAI Endorsed Transactions on Energy Web","volume":"329 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"EAI Endorsed Transactions on Energy Web","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4108/ew.5991","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We consider a jamming problem in which a jammer aims to degrade a user’s communication in which the user might differ in applied applications or communication purposes. Such differences are reflected by different communication metrics used by the user. Specifically, signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) is used as a metric to reflect regular data transmission purposes. Meanwhile, as another metric, latency, modeled by the inverse SINR, is used to reflect emergency communication purposes. We consider the most difficult scenario for the jammer where it does not know which application (metric) the user employs. The problem is formulated as a Bayesian game. Equilibrium is found in closed form, and the dependence of equilibrium on network parameters is illustrated.