EXPRESS: To Hinder or to Facilitate: Retailers’ Strategy of Consumer Information Sharing

IF 5.4 3区 材料科学 Q2 CHEMISTRY, PHYSICAL
Buqing Ma, Guang Li, Guangwen Kong
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Abstract

Consumer information sharing is considered an effective strategy to attract consumers, yet certain high-end retailers, such as Bergdorf Goodman and Farfetch, tend to hinder consumers from sharing information through online reviews. We study a retailer’s strategy for consumer information sharing in a supply chain. We find that a retailer’s information sharing strategy can prevent manufacturers from extracting excessive profit when consumers are heterogeneous in their valuations of the selling product. Specifically, a retailer can achieve a higher profit margin by targeting all consumer segments. By strategically choosing the information sharing strategy to influence consumer beliefs, the retailer can induce the manufacturer to conform to the retailer’s preferred targeting segment through a low wholesale price. Thus, a high-end retailer, whose consumers have a high ex-ante quality belief, favors hindering information sharing among consumers because it enables the retailer to target all consumer segments. Interestingly, deterring consumers from learning about the product quality may generate more consumer surplus. Our main results are robust under extensions such as consumer search behavior, consumer waiting, and multiple product selling. When selling multiple products, a retailer with a large quality variation is better off hindering consumers from sharing information. Our work shows that strategically choosing a consumer information sharing strategy enables retailers to enhance profit margins in their interactions with upstream manufacturers.
快递:是阻碍还是促进?零售商共享消费者信息的策略
消费者信息共享被认为是吸引消费者的有效策略,但某些高端零售商,如 Bergdorf Goodman 和 Farfetch,往往会阻碍消费者通过在线评论共享信息。我们研究了零售商在供应链中的消费者信息共享策略。我们发现,当消费者对销售产品的评价存在异质性时,零售商的信息共享策略可以防止制造商攫取过多利润。具体来说,零售商可以通过针对所有消费者群体获得更高的利润率。通过战略性地选择信息共享策略来影响消费者的信念,零售商可以通过低批发价诱使制造商符合零售商偏好的目标细分市场。因此,高端零售商(其消费者事前对质量有较高的信念)倾向于阻碍消费者之间的信息共享,因为这能使零售商瞄准所有的消费群体。有趣的是,阻止消费者了解产品质量可能会产生更多的消费者剩余。我们的主要结果在消费者搜索行为、消费者等待和多产品销售等扩展情况下都是稳健的。在销售多种产品时,质量差异较大的零售商最好阻止消费者分享信息。我们的研究表明,战略性地选择消费者信息共享策略能使零售商在与上游制造商的互动中提高利润率。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
ACS Applied Energy Materials
ACS Applied Energy Materials Materials Science-Materials Chemistry
CiteScore
10.30
自引率
6.20%
发文量
1368
期刊介绍: ACS Applied Energy Materials is an interdisciplinary journal publishing original research covering all aspects of materials, engineering, chemistry, physics and biology relevant to energy conversion and storage. The journal is devoted to reports of new and original experimental and theoretical research of an applied nature that integrate knowledge in the areas of materials, engineering, physics, bioscience, and chemistry into important energy applications.
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