Modal appearances and the modal ontological argument

IF 0.5 3区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION Pub Date : 2024-05-03 DOI:10.1007/s11153-024-09916-2

James Simpson

引用次数: 0

Abstract

In a recent paper in this journal, McIntosh (2021) argues that a modalized version of an epistemic principle of phenomenal conservativism can be used to successfully defend the key possibility premise of the modal ontological argument for the existence of God. I argue, however, that such a defense of the possibility premise is not going to be successful even if one concedes a number of contentious claims to McIntosh.

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模态表象和模态本体论论证

麦金托什（McIntosh，2021）在本刊最近发表的一篇论文中指出，现象保守主义认识论原则的模态化版本可以用来成功地为上帝存在的模态本体论论证的关键可能性前提辩护。然而，我认为，即使承认麦金托什的一些有争议的主张，这种对可能性前提的辩护也不会成功。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION Multiple-

CiteScore

1.10

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The organ of no single institution or sectarian school, philosophical or religious, the International Journal for Philosophy of Religion provides a medium for the exposition, development, and criticism of important philosophical insights and theories relevant to religion in any of its varied forms. It also provides a forum for critical, constructive, and interpretative consideration of religion from an objective philosophical point of view. Articles, symposia, discussions, reviews, notes, and news in this journal are intended to serve the interests of a wide range of thoughtful readers, especially teachers and students of philosophy, philosophical theology and religious thought. Unsolicited book reviews are not accepted for publication in the International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. If you would like to review a book for the journal, please contact the Book Review Editor: Scott A. Davison, Morehead State University s.davison@morehead-st.edu