{"title":"Is the incumbent crying or laughing: when does the entrant adopt the market expansion entry strategy?","authors":"Shu Wang, Dun Liu, Jiajia Nie","doi":"10.1108/k-01-2024-0109","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Purpose</h3>\n<p>It is only logical that a firm aims to make a profit after entering the market. However, some firms enter the market with the goal of market expansion and even burn money to pursue market share, which is counterintuitive in practice. To explore the theoretical foundations behind this rare phenomenon, this paper focuses on discussing the impact of the market expansion entry strategy on the entrant firm and the incumbent firm.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Design/methodology/approach</h3>\n<p>Using a game theory model of a supply chain with an incumbent and an entrant, this paper explores the mathematical conditions for the entrant to adopt either the traditional or the market expansion entry strategy and investigates the incumbent’s benefits and losses under different entry strategies.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Findings</h3>\n<p>The results show that when the market-expansion effect and the selling price ceiling are moderate, the entrant firm always adopts the market expansion entry strategy, and the incumbent firm obtains a free ride from the entrant firm and benefits from it. The entire industry profits and the industry consumer surplus are increased. In particular, we further investigate the cases in which the incumbent firm has a first-mover advantage or there is a troublesome cost, and the results confirm the aforementioned conclusions.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->\n<h3>Originality/value</h3>\n<p>By considering market share as the entrant’s goal, this paper contributes to the dual-purpose literature. Moreover, based on the model’s mathematical results, this paper offers relevant management insights for the entrant and its stakeholders in the e-commerce platform.</p><!--/ Abstract__block -->","PeriodicalId":49930,"journal":{"name":"Kybernetes","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Kybernetes","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1108/k-01-2024-0109","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, CYBERNETICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Purpose
It is only logical that a firm aims to make a profit after entering the market. However, some firms enter the market with the goal of market expansion and even burn money to pursue market share, which is counterintuitive in practice. To explore the theoretical foundations behind this rare phenomenon, this paper focuses on discussing the impact of the market expansion entry strategy on the entrant firm and the incumbent firm.
Design/methodology/approach
Using a game theory model of a supply chain with an incumbent and an entrant, this paper explores the mathematical conditions for the entrant to adopt either the traditional or the market expansion entry strategy and investigates the incumbent’s benefits and losses under different entry strategies.
Findings
The results show that when the market-expansion effect and the selling price ceiling are moderate, the entrant firm always adopts the market expansion entry strategy, and the incumbent firm obtains a free ride from the entrant firm and benefits from it. The entire industry profits and the industry consumer surplus are increased. In particular, we further investigate the cases in which the incumbent firm has a first-mover advantage or there is a troublesome cost, and the results confirm the aforementioned conclusions.
Originality/value
By considering market share as the entrant’s goal, this paper contributes to the dual-purpose literature. Moreover, based on the model’s mathematical results, this paper offers relevant management insights for the entrant and its stakeholders in the e-commerce platform.
期刊介绍:
Kybernetes is the official journal of the UNESCO recognized World Organisation of Systems and Cybernetics (WOSC), and The Cybernetics Society.
The journal is an important forum for the exchange of knowledge and information among all those who are interested in cybernetics and systems thinking.
It is devoted to improvement in the understanding of human, social, organizational, technological and sustainable aspects of society and their interdependencies. It encourages consideration of a range of theories, methodologies and approaches, and their transdisciplinary links. The spirit of the journal comes from Norbert Wiener''s understanding of cybernetics as "The Human Use of Human Beings." Hence, Kybernetes strives for examination and analysis, based on a systemic frame of reference, of burning issues of ecosystems, society, organizations, businesses and human behavior.