Performance information and issue prioritization by political and managerial decision-makers: A discrete choice experiment

IF 5.2 1区 管理学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Joris van der Voet, Amandine Lerusse
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Issue prioritization is the first stage of attention-based theories of decision-making, but remains theoretically and empirically uncharted territory in public administration research. We propose and test how issue prioritization is informed by the characteristics of the performance information on which decision-makers rely, in particular its source (internal or external information), nature (objective or subjective information), aspiration level (historical, social, or coercive aspirations), and required cognitive effort (attention costs). Furthermore, we theorize how these characteristics of performance information determine issue prioritization decisions of political and managerial decision-makers in different ways. We empirically examine issue prioritization decisions in road maintenance and primary school education using a discrete choice experiment among 2,313 local government officials. The experiment reveals that decision-makers are more likely to prioritize issues that are signaled through objective performance measures and that are articulated relative to coercive aspirations, but that the effects of the information’s source and attention costs differ between policy domains. Comparison of observational variation regarding decision-makers’ roles indicates that public managers more strongly prioritize road maintenance issues that are articulated in objective performance information, but not in primary school education. The study advances public administration research and theory with a ‘horizontal’ behavioral perspective on decision-makers’ information processing to prioritize between simultaneous performance issues.
绩效信息与政治和管理决策者对问题的优先排序:离散选择实验
问题优先排序是以注意力为基础的决策理论的第一阶段,但在公共行政研究中,在理论和实证方面仍是未知领域。我们提出并检验了决策者所依赖的绩效信息的特征,尤其是其来源(内部或外部信息)、性质(客观或主观信息)、期望水平(历史、社会或强制期望)以及所需的认知努力(注意力成本),是如何影响问题优先排序的。此外,我们还从理论上分析了绩效信息的这些特征是如何以不同方式决定政治决策者和管理决策者的问题优先级决策的。我们在 2313 名地方政府官员中进行了离散选择实验,对道路维护和小学教育中的问题优先级决策进行了实证研究。实验结果表明,决策者更倾向于优先考虑那些通过客观绩效衡量标准发出信号的问题,以及那些相对于胁迫性愿望的问题,但信息来源和注意力成本对不同政策领域的影响是不同的。对决策者角色的观察差异进行比较后发现,公共管理者会更优先考虑客观绩效信息中阐明的道路维护问题,但小学教育中的道路维护问题则不然。这项研究从 "横向 "行为角度探讨了决策者在处理信息时如何在同时出现的绩效问题之间进行优先排序,从而推动了公共管理研究和理论的发展。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.50
自引率
11.90%
发文量
46
期刊介绍: The Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory serves as a bridge between public administration or public management scholarship and public policy studies. The Journal aims to provide in-depth analysis of developments in the organizational, administrative, and policy sciences as they apply to government and governance. Each issue brings you critical perspectives and cogent analyses, serving as an outlet for the best theoretical and research work in the field. The Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory is the official journal of the Public Management Research Association.
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