Cyberbiosecurity in the new normal: Cyberbio risks, pre-emptive security, and the global governance of bioinformation

IF 2.5 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Noran Shafik Fouad
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Abstract

The Covid-19 pandemic saw a surge in cyber attacks targeting pharmaceutical companies and research organisations working on vaccines and treatments for the virus. Such attacks raised concerns around the (in)security of bioinformation (e.g. genomic data, epidemiological data, biomedical data, and health data) and the potential cyberbio risks resulting from stealing, compromising, or exploiting it in hostile cyber operations. This article critically investigates threat discourses around bioinformation as presented in the newly emerging field of ‘cyberbiosecurity’. As introduced by scholarly literature in life sciences, cyberbiosecurity aims to understand and address cyber risks engendered by the digitisation of biology. Such risks include, for example, embedding malware in DNA, corrupting gene-sequencing, manipulating biomedical materials, stealing epidemiological data, or even developing biological weapons and spreading diseases. This article brings the discussion on cyberbiosecurity into the realms of International Relations and Security Studies by problematising the futuristic threat discourses co-producing this burgeoning field and the pre-emptive security measures it advocates, specifically in relation to bioinformation. It analyses how cyberbiosecurity as a concept and field of policy analysis influences the existing securitised governance of bioinformation, the global competition to control it, and the inequalities associated with its ownership and dissemination. As such, the article presents a critical intervention in current debates around the intersection between biological dangers and cyber threats and in the calls for ‘peculiar’ policy measures to defend against cyberbio risks in the ‘new normal’.

新常态下的网络生物安全:网络生物风险、先发制人的安全和生物信息的全球治理
在 Covid-19 大流行期间,针对制药公司和研究机构的网络攻击激增,这些公司和机构正在研究该病毒的疫苗和治疗方法。此类攻击引发了人们对生物信息(如基因组数据、流行病学数据、生物医学数据和健康数据)(不)安全性的担忧,以及在敌对网络行动中窃取、破坏或利用生物信息所带来的潜在网络生物风险。本文对新兴的 "网络生物安全 "领域中围绕生物信息的威胁论述进行了批判性研究。正如生命科学学术文献所介绍的那样,网络生物安全旨在了解和应对生物数字化所带来的网络风险。这些风险包括在 DNA 中嵌入恶意软件、破坏基因测序、操纵生物医学材料、窃取流行病学数据,甚至开发生物武器和传播疾病等。本文将网络生物安全的讨论引入国际关系和安全研究领域,对共同产生这一新兴领域的未来主义威胁论述及其倡导的先发制人的安全措施(特别是与生物信息相关的安全措施)提出质疑。文章分析了网络生物安全作为一个概念和政策分析领域如何影响现有的生物信息安全治理、控制生物信息的全球竞争以及与生物信息所有权和传播相关的不平等现象。因此,这篇文章对当前围绕生物危险与网络威胁之间的交集以及在 "新常态 "下采取 "特殊 "政策措施抵御网络生物风险的呼声进行了批判性干预。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.40
自引率
13.60%
发文量
30
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